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Abstract
We present a new dataset comprising more than 1900 regimes in 197 polities over the
time period 1789–2016. We use this dataset to describe different historical patterns of regime
duration globally, leveraging fine-grained measures on when regimes started and ended and
a nuanced scheme of different modes of regime breakdown. To mention a few patterns, we
display how the frequency of regime breakdown, and particular modes of breakdown, have
followed cyclical rather than linear patterns across modern history and that the most common
modes, overall, are coups d’e´tat and incumbent-guided transformations of regimes. Further,
we evaluate whether selected economic and political-institutional features are systematically
associated with breakdown. We find robust evidence that low income levels, slow or negative
economic growth, and having intermediate levels of democracy predict higher chances of regime
breakdown, although these factors are more clearly related to regime breakdown during some
periods of modern history than others. When disaggregating different models of breakdown,
we find notable differences for these predictors, with low income levels, for example, being
strongly related to regime breakdowns due to popular uprisings, whereas intermediate levels
of democracy clearly predict regime breakdowns due to coups and incumbent-guided regime
transitions.
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1 Introduction
All political regimes eventually die, but they do so in very different ways. Some regimes un-
dergo self-imposed change and transform into something else “from the inside”. Examples
are autocratic regimes liberalizing to become democracies or democratically elected presi-
dents conducting self-coups. Other regimes are terminated by outside forces. Examples are
popular protests setting off a revolution, military officers coordinating a coup d’e´tat, or a
foreign power intervening and forcing out the incumbent regime.
Understanding such processes of regime breakdown and change has long been a core
concern of social scientists (early contributions include Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Lipset,
1959; Moore, 1966). While data from the post-WWII era suggest that a minority of regime
breakdowns were followed by democratization (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014), the con-
temporary literature places a special focus on such regime changes (e.g., Coppedge, 2012;
Teorell, 2010). Yet, democratic breakdowns (e.g., Svolik, 2008) and transitions between
different types of autocracies (e.g., Hadenius and Teorell, 2007) have also received atten-
tion. Further, distinct literatures address particular processes of regime breakdown, such
as popular revolutions (e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011) and coups d’e´tat (e.g., Powell,
2012). Regarding the potential determinants of regime breakdown, some studies highlight
structural factors, such as (various) regime-type characteristics (c.f. Gates et al., 2006; Ged-
des, 1999), poverty (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997), and natural resource abundance (Ross,
2012). Other studies highlight “trigger” factors – events that disrupt previous equilibria and
prompt regime opponents to mobilize against the regime – including elections (e.g., Knutsen,
Nyg˚ard and Wig, 2017), international wars (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller, 1992),
and economic crises (e.g., Przeworski and Limongi, 1997).
Despite all the attention given to regime breakdown (and change) our cumulative under-
standing of this key phenomenon has been restricted by the following features: 1) Extant
studies often circumscribe their focus to consider particular types of transitions, notably
democratization. 2) Most studies have a restrictive scope, mainly focusing on decades after
WWII – a relatively short period of “modern history”. Even within this time-frame, stud-
ies suggest that both the causes (Ross, 2012) and main modes (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz,
2014) of regime breakdown may have shifted. While there are benefits to studying a more
homogeneous set of cases, we thus run the risk that our knowledge claims about regime
breakdown and change, based on post-WWII data, may be less robust (Knutsen, Møller and
Skaaning, 2016) or have less general applicability (Boix, 2011) than is commonly supposed.
We present a new dataset that may help alleviate these limitations. The “Historical
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Regime Data” (HRD) includes measures on the identity, time period of existence, and mode
of breakdown for more than 1900 regimes. HRD spans most large polities, globally, after the
French revolution, documenting the life-cycles of regimes at a high level of temporal precision.
HRD is nested into the larger Historical Varieties of Democracy (HVDEM) dataset (Knutsen
et al., 2017) – which contains several hundred indicators that can easily be mapped on to the
identified regimes to carefully describe their institutional make-up and evolution – and thus
covers the 91 countries, semi-autonomous polities and colonies in Historical V-Dem from
1789–1920. Further, HRD covers all polities covered by V-Dem v.7 (Coppedge et al 2017a)
from 1900 onwards. Thus, HRD includes data for 197 polities with some time series running
from 1789–2016.
In the following, we fist elaborate on the concepts of ‘political regime’ and ‘regime break-
down’, outlining our definitions and key alternatives. We then discuss key issues and op-
erational rules for identifying regimes and breakdowns. Next, we describe and illustrate
the specific variables contained in HRD, before we use the data to map patterns of regime
breakdown across modern history. After that, we review extant literature on three proposed
determinants of regime breakdown – level of democracy, income level, and short-term eco-
nomic growth – before we present our empirical results. To quickly preview a few findings,
regimes with a mix of democratic and autocratic features are significantly more prone to
break down than full democracies and autocracies, and high income levels and high short-
term growth seem to inoculate regimes from breakdown. Also when considering various
modes of breakdown, these factors often (though far from always) turn up as key predictors.
Further, we run change-point models to identify time periods with relatively frequent and
infrequent regime changes, and assess the relevance of the mentioned predictors in different
time periods. Democracy level, income level, and short-term growth are especially clearly
related to regime breakdown from the start of WWI to a few years after the Cold War ended,
a period of modern history characterized by frequent regime changes.
2 Political regimes and regime breakdown: Conceptu-
alization and operational issues
We define a ‘political regime’ as the set of rules that are essential for selecting political leaders,
and for maintaining them in power. These can be formal rules, for instance embedded in
constitutions, but also informal rules and practices, enforced by a broader or narrower group
of people. Thus, a regime is typically characterized by it determining who selects policies,
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and, in extension, often also how these policies are typically selected. One key benefit of
this definition, which closely follows that of Geddes (1999), is that it allows for capturing
multiple, relevant instances of changes to a country’s political system. When relying on
this definition, we need not limit ourselves to capturing only one particular type of regime
change, such as “democratic transitions”.
We highlight that formal and informal rules for determining political leaders often co-
exist. If the formal and informal rules correspond – i.e., the formal rules are followed –
stability in the formal rules can be used to identify a regime. This situation is common in
modern democracies with a strong rule of law. In these instances, evaluating continuation
of key formal rules – for example as written in the constitution – provide clear operational
criteria for judging the regime’s continued existence. If, however, the formal and informal
rules for selecting and maintaining leaders do not correspond, such as in many dictatorships,
the informal rules take precedence when identifying a regime as they de facto determine
who selects policies. To exemplify, if the constitution stipulates that leaders are elected
through multi-party elections, but leaders were, in fact, selected through a military coup
and maintained by a coalition of military officers, the latter features determine the regime,
according to our definition. We elaborate on specific, operational issues for identifying
regimes below, but first provide a contrast with alternative notions of regimes and regime
change.
2.1 Alternative notions and measures of regime change
Table 1 illustrates that there are multiple ways to define what constitutes a regime or regime
change. One common alternative in the political science literature is to invoke the distinction
between democracies and autocracies, and define regime change (only or mainly) according
to substantial changes along this dimension (e.g., Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010;
Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2013). Degree of democracy is critically associated with the
formal rules through which leaders are selected and deposed, such as the existence of multi-
party elections and universal franchise. But, most scholars acknowledge that also informal
rules and practices matter for democracy, for example pertaining to whether elections are
conducted freely and fairly or if elections are associated with some kind of fraud – not
described in the constitution – that determines outcomes.
While not restricted to considering these elements pertaining to democracy, our preferred
regime definition encapsulates such elements, and thus allows us to capture regime changes
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Table 1: Regime datasets with global coverage
Dataset Time period Granularity Regime-change type Definition
HRD 1789-2016 Day All regime changes Informal and formal
rules for maintaining power
Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) 1946-2012 Day All regime changes, Informal and formal
focused on between-type rules for maintaining power
Hadenius and Teorell (2007) 1972-2014 Year Regime type-based Institutional modes of leader selection
(Military, hereditary, electoral)
Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013) 1900-2012 Year Regime type-based Democracy-Autocracy
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) 1946-2008 Year Regime type-based Democracy-Autocracy, with sub-types
Svolik (2012) 1946-2008 Year Regime type-based Authoritarian spells (vs. democracy, no authority)
Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2013) 1800-2015 Year Movements “democracy scale” 3-point change Polity score (in three years or less)
or end of transition period
stemming from substantial changes to, e.g., electoral practices.1 But, critically, our definition
also allows us to capture other regime breakdowns and subsequent changes, including changes
between regimes that are equally (un)democratic. To exemplify, our definition covers changes
between a harshly repressive one-party state, where party bosses select leaders through some
formal or informal process, and an about equally repressive absolutist monarchy, where
particular rules of dynastic succession determine leader selection. It also covers changes
between two military regimes (i.e., regimes belonging to the same “autocracy type”) with
distinct military juntas operating different informal rules for selecting the leadership.
Extant datasets with global coverage that identify regimes or regime change include, but
are not restricted to, Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013),
Hadenius and Teorell (2007), Svolik (2012), Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), and (Mar-
shall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2013). Table 1 provides an overview of the temporal and spatial
scope of these widely used datasets, and their temporal granularity (i.e. whether regime
changes are coded at the level of years or days). The table also describes the type of changes
considered to be regime changes, roughly distinguishing between “type-based” changes (i.e.,
where the regime has to change from one regime type to another to constitute a regime
change) and regime changes that do not hinge on change in type (“all regime changes”). Most
“type-based” datasets rely on some version of the above-described democracy-autocracy dis-
tinction for identifying regimes, whereas Hadenius and Teorell (2007) relies on the different
institutional modes of selecting leaders (military, hereditary, electoral) for identifying (au-
thoritarian) regimes. Since we maintain that regime change can occur also between regimes
that are commonly classified as belonging to the same type, our HRD dataset thus includes
more regime changes than these datasets focusing only on type-based transitions. HRD is
1We highlight that regular government changes in democracies following an incumbent loss in free and
fair elections are not counted as regime changes.
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most closely related to the Geddes et al. dataset (henceforth “GWF”) in terms of conceptu-
alization and delineating political regimes, though there are notable differences. Given this,
but also because Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) carefully compare GWF with the other
widely used datasets listed in Table 1, we focus our discussion on similarities and contrasts
between HRD and GWF.
One notable difference between GWF and HRD is that the former – while remaining open
to including clear instances of change between regimes of identical type – takes transitions
between its own categories of autocratic regime types (military, dominant party, personalist,
etc.) as a key point of departure when looking for regime change. HRD does not operate
with a clear categorization of “types” as its basis for identifying regime changes. Instead, we
take the broader question of identifying when the formal or informal rules for selecting and
maintaining leaders are substantially altered as our point of departure, and develop a large
set of heuristics for identifying changes to these rules (in a manner that is consistent across
countries and time). These heuristics were used in conjunction with a thorough reading of
secondary sources to delineate regime units and determine the dates of regime births and
deaths directly.
As Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) point out, there is a tradeoff between using simple
coding rules and the reliability that they bring versus the ability to capture complex concepts
such as regime breakdown in a valid manner. Whereas clear, objective rules may increase
replicability, they may also disregard nuance and risk imprecision. HRD emphasizes the
latter half of this tradeoff to an even greater extent than GWF (and much more so than, for
example, Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)), but also seeks to ensure replicability and
transparency through providing detailed notes justifying each coding decision alongside lists
of sources used for the coding. Prioritizing the ability to capture various kinds of regime
change and dispensing with a restrictive set of “sharp rules” becomes even more important
because of the extensive time period HRD covers. Whereas GWF starts in 1946, HRD
extends back to 1789, increasing the heterogeneity of regimes and changes covered.
Let us, however, illustrate the benefits of our approach by using a more recent case,
included also in GWF, namely Reza Shah’s Iran (see Figure 1 for coding timelines). GWF
codes Iran as having a single regime from 1925 to the Shah’s flight in 1979. In HRD, this
regime spell – which is coded to start, more precisely, on December 15, 1925 – is broken
up by both the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion (November 16) and the coup of August 19,
1953. Though accounts disagree on, e.g., the importance of CIA interference in the 1953
coup, several scholars agree on the coup’s significance for how Iran was governed in practice
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Figure 1: Timeline of Regimes in Iran: Comparison of HRD (top) and GWF (bottom)
coding, 1925–2015.2
(Gasiorowski, 1987; Gasiorowski and Byrne, 2004; Abrahamian, 2013; Takeyh, 2014; Zahrani,
2002). Gasiorowski (1987, 1), for example, notes that the “government of Prime Minister
Mohammad Mosaddeq which was ousted in the coup was the last popular, democratically
oriented government to hold office in Iran.” In this instance, we therefore consider that the
nature of the pre-coup regime, including an actual elected Prime Minister functioning far
beyond nominal status, is so different from the ensuing post-coup personal monarchy that the
two should not be regarded a single regime defined by the Shah’s rule, even if the monarchy,
as such, persists.
More generally, HRD applies lower thresholds for coding regime deaths than GWF,
mostly resulting from a more inclusive notion of what to count as a “substantial” change
in rules for selecting political leaders. Hence, across the overlapping country-years where
Geddes et al. count 280 autocratic regimes and 207 democratic episodes, HRD contains 925
regimes. We emphasize that transitional regimes are important to count as separate regime
spells (e.g., in order not to overestimate regime duration). Again, the HRD coding of Iran
serves as a good example. When the Shah’s regime is, eventually, toppled by the clergy
and Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, there is a period of confusion between the Shah’s flight
on January 16 and the declaration of the Islamic Republic on April 1. In this period, the
Regency Council attempts to rule in the Shah’s absence (Rubinstein, 1981), separating it
from the consolidated Khomeini rule beginning in April.
2In Svolik (2012), HRD’s regime change events are recorded as leadership change, but the entirety of the
period is coded as one single authoritarian spell.
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2.2 Operational criteria for identifying regimes in HRD
While our definition opens up for a comprehensive and fine-grained account of countries’
regime histories, it also presents several operational challenges. How do we judge whether a
rule change is substantial, and thus sufficient for constituting regime change? Further, how
do we ensure that we capture substantial changes to informal rules, which are inherently
hard to observe. We devised several strategies in response to these challenges, constructing
several heuristics for identifying substantial rule changes and for coding regime breakdowns
consistently across time and space. While the bulk of discussion is presented in the online
appendix – with a particular focus on how we coded particularly difficult cases pertaining
to self-coups and other incumbent-guided regime transitions, cases of de-colonization, and
cases where a polity splits up into several entities – we briefly discuss some key issues here.
First, we note that our definition implies that vastly different processes can premeditate
regime breakdown. These include, but are not restricted to, coups conducted by the mili-
tary or other actors, self-coups conducted by sitting leaders, losses in civil war or inter-state
war, popular uprisings, and substantial political liberalization with guidance by incumbents.
These processes are covered in our 14-category mode of breakdown variable, and served as
key markers for our coders when considering when a regime ended. Second, we identified
other marque events, notably leadership changes, as candidates for further scrutiny. Some-
times, regime changes are related to government or leadership changes, such as the change
in Zaire/DR Congo from the Mobutu- to the Kabila regime (see, e.g., Schatzberg, 1997).
We immediately note that government or leadership changes do not necessarily bring regime
changes, as exemplified by post-election government changes in democracies, or by the insti-
tutionalized changes to prime ministers and presidents in current China. We also note that
regime changes can take place without leadership changes, for example when military juntas
institutionalize one-party rule.
But, for any potential candidate for regime breakdown, how did we identify whether a
changes in rules and practices for selecting and maintaining leaders is substantial or not?
Such changes can, of course, be relatively minor – think, for instance, of the minimum
voting age being lowered from 20 to 18 years. This, we surmise, is not a substantial change.
Likewise, we do not consider minor constitutional amendments or changes to the electoral
formulae to be sufficient for constituting regime change. While setting the threshold for
what constitutes a substantial change is (inherently) open to discussion, we streamlined a
set of criteria and pursue them consistently across contexts.3 These criteria are presented
3All codings come with a set of detailed notes elaborating on our decision, allowing researchers preferring
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and discussed in Appendices E–F. To mention one prominent example, we consider a regime
change to have occurred if suffrage – in a regime holding contested multi-party elections
and where these formal rules for leader selection is followed – is extended from only being
granted to males to being universal. Sometimes a number of smaller changes to formal or
informal rules, spaced out over a period of time, may incrementally add up to a substantial
change. In such cases, it hard to determine exactly when the regime change occurred. Yet,
if the accumulated changes are substantial, we still count such processes as regime change.
To illustrate this, we discuss the example of Italy in the 1920s and the transition to a Fascist
regime led by Mussolini below.
Finally, we highlight that in cases where formal and informal rules diverge (or where no
formal rules exist at all), a key feature of the incumbent regime is the coalition of actors that
select and sustain leaders; these actors administer the informal rules. When such coalitions
change dramatically, so to, we presume, do the informal rules and practices of selecting and
maintaining leaders. Thus, in settings where formal rules have little relevance, the make-up
of the support coalition can help us in identifying regime units. As common examples of
operational criteria, we consider who makes up a military junta and who supports them
as relevant for delineating many military regimes, while royal families and their rules for
familial inheritance help define monarchical regimes.
3 The contents of HRD and patterns in regime devel-
opment throughout modern history
HRD includes variables on regime start dates, end dates, and modes of breakdown. The latter
has 14 categories and exists in both a single-selection (most important) and multiple-selection
format, capturing that multiple processes may lead up to, and be relevant for, breakdown.
In addition, dichotomous variables record uncertainty in the date variables and whether a
country experiences an interregnum period (which is used very sparsely; see Appendix D).
We code regime breakdowns and origins down to the day, where possible, describing even
short-lived and transitory regimes in sequence, rather than settling for a coarse account of
history. To exemplify, we capture the twelve different coups that took place in Haiti prior
to the 1915 U.S. occupation, down to their date.
The 197 polities covered by HRD include the vast majority of sovereign states (e.g.,
Bavaria, 1789–1871 or Ethiopia, 1789–2016), several semi-autonomous polities (e.g., Hungary
higher thresholds for counting regime change to re-code the units.
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Figure 2: Absolute number of regimes per year included in the dataset, 1789–2016
1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
16
0
18
0
Year
N
um
be
r o
f r
eg
im
es
under the Dual Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy), and numerous colonies (e.g., British India).4
Figure 2 displays the number of regimes that existed during a given year, from 1789–2016,
with the increasing trend reflecting that the number of polities included is growing (especially
around 1900). Appendix Table A-1 lists all polity-years covered by HRD.
In fact, for the polities included from 1789, the first recorded regime is the one that existed
on January 1st that year. Thus, France’s first regime (Louis XV’s Maupeou parliaments)
extends from 1768–1789, but other regimes have birth dates further back in time. Examples
are Japan under Tokugawa rule, where the end of the siege of Osaka (January 22, 1615)
marks the start date, and Peru under Spanish colonial administration, where the Viceroyalty
of Peru is dated back to 1543.5
There is substantial geographical variation in the frequency of regime changes in HRD,
which stems partly from some countries having longer time series than others and partly
4These are the polities covered by Historical V-Dem (1789–1920) and by V-Dem v.7 (1900–2016).
5Despite the careful assessment of all available sources that our coders could identify (in English, but
also in Spanish, Italian, German and other languages where relevant), there is a dearth of sources with
fine-grained accounts for some smaller and medium-sized polities, especially in early years. Hence, we may
under-count number of regime changes in such instances. This possibility is illustrated by Bolivia, which
was among the countries where we employed a second coder for inter-coder reliability tests (see Appendix
B). The second coder failed to identify two (of the many) regime changes (via coups) in the 1930s that
the original coder had identified, but only from one particular source (namely Hudson and Hanratty, 1991,
28-32). Yet, our inter-coder reliability tests show that the coders, in general, mostly pick up and code the
same instances of regime change, implying that the issue of under-counting may not be too large.
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Figure 3: Number of recorded regime changes, 1789–2016
Regime changes in the world 1789−2015
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from some countries having more “eventful” political histories. Figure 3 reveals that Central
and South America have many recorded regimes. For example, Peru has 41 recorded regimes,
Mexico has 43, and Bolivia has 45. But, also West Africa, the Arabian peninsula, South Asia,
and Southern Europe display relatively many regimes. Spain, for example, has 22 recorded
regime changes, mainly owing to the seven tumultuous decades between the Napoleonic
occupation in 1808 and the implementation of constitutional monarchy in 1876 counting 16
regimes. North America, North Europe and East Asia display relatively few regime changes
(despite long time series). For instance, Sweden only counts 7 regimes, whereas Canada
and Japan have 6 each. As we return to in the final section, there is also considerable
variation in regime-change frequency over time. The decades between 1880 and WWI were
relatively “stable”, with between 1% and 5% of extant regimes breaking down in any given
year. Also the recent period from 1995 onwards have experienced relative few breakdowns.
In contrast, about 20% of regimes broke down in the revolutionary year of 1848, a number
almost replicated in the years directly following WWI and WWII.
We now turn to discussing the particular variables from HRD and clarifying and exempli-
fying coding decisions for important and recurring issues. In Appendix B, we further describe
the data collection process and routines and division of labor within the team. Appendix C
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includes the notes contained in the dataset for selected countries.6
3.1 Start and end dates
The regime start and end date variables, v3regstartdate and v3regenddate, respond to the
questions: “When did the political regime obtain power?” and “When did the political
regime lose power?”. For about 140 of 1900 cases it proved extremely difficult to specify
exact start dates, and month (about 120 instances) or even year (about 20 instances) was
then coded. The cases are assigned dates according to rules laid out in the appendix, and
we also code whenever dates are uncertain. Absent interregnum periods, we always code so
that the end date of a regime is identical to the start date of the next one. Hence, these
dates can be interpreted as denoting date of “regime change”.
Figure 4 illustrates the granularity of the data, showing regime changes occurring in
European countries in 1848, the “year of revolution” (Rapport, 2008). Several regime changes
occured in March following right after the late-February revolution in France. Also some
later changes are due to popular uprisings, but yet others are due to guided liberalization
of existing regimes as well as “counter revolutions”, such as in Prussia in December(coded
by HRD as a self-coup). The y-axis displays the duration of the “dying” regime, illustrating
that both long-lived regimes, such as the (Post-Pragmatic Sanction) Habsburg regime in
Hungary, and very short-lived regimes, such as the “Provisional Government” of Modena
that lasted from March 22 to August 8, 1848, broke down.7
When the historical sources identified are adequate, military and civilian coup dates are
generally clear-cut to register as exact end dates. Also for revolutionary episodes, end dates
are often quite easy to pinpoint. Determining start and end dates for other cases are more
difficult, including cases where it is clear that a change is occurring whilst the event to
mark it is unclear or cases where it is difficult to determine whether the change to formal or
informal rules for selecting leaders is substantial enough to constitute breakdown. The former
cases include situations when substantial, but gradual, liberalization takes place, and when
substantial, but gradual, concentration of power within a narrower ruling elite occurs. Such
transition periods are often coded as distinct, shorter-lived regimes. The Italian transition to
Fascist rule under Mussolini illustrates this scenario. Clearly, the rules defining Mussolini’s
reign differed substantially from those of the Kingdom of Italy under the House of Savoy. Yet,
6The notes and sources for the entire set of countries can be found at ANONYMIZED WEBPAGE.
7The Austrian and Hungarian spells from March 1848 to June and October, respectively, are coded as
interregnum periods.
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Figure 4: Regime end dates in Europe, 1848
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determining the exact transition is challenging. During the 1921-1922 period, the biennio
nero (“two black years”), national law enforcement crumbled and paramilitary Fascist groups
gained territory and eventually aimed at taking the capital (Smith, 1989). After King Victor
Emmanuel III asked Mussolini to form a government on October 29, 1922, this government
initially operated under the same constitutional rules as its predecessor. In November 1923,
the so-called Acerbo electoral law was passed, stating that the party with the largest share
of the vote – even if only a mere 25 percent – would gain an absolute majority of Senate
seats. (Yet, it was only in the April 1925 elections that the Acerbo law demonstrated its
effect.) This gradual transition is resolved in HRD by coding a separate regime, beginning
with Victor Emmanuel’s decision on October 29, 1922 and ending with the passing of the
Acerbo law,8 before coding a new regime representing the definitive Fascist epoch.
3.2 Regime end type
The regime end type codings responds to the questions “Could you specify the type of process
that you consider the most important in leading to the end of the regime?” (v3regendtype)
and “Could you specify the type of processes (one or more) that led to the end of the
regime?” (v3regendtypems). HRD thus contains both a single-selection and multiple-selection
end type coding. The answers to both questions take the form of categories (0 through
13). Figure 5 shows the relative frequency of all modes of regime breakdown, according
to v3regendtype, for the entire historical period. “Other guided transformation” – which
includes processes such as directed changes from monarchy to republic, the merging of two
or more monarchies into one, changes in rules of succession, or colonial transfers to self-rule
– is the most frequent mode of breakdown. However, military coups are almost equally
frequent, and when combined with “coup by other” (e.g., palace coups in monarchies or
coups by certain party members in single-party regimes), coups constitute the most common
mode.
Figure 6, drawing on v3regendtype, displays how four particular modes of regime break-
down – coups (by military or others combined), uprisings, interstate war, and guided liber-
alization – have evolved from 1789–2016. For each mode, we fit a Loess smoothed line (span
8The decision by Victor Emmanuel was within the boundaries of the law, but was made after three years of
near civil war and an armed invasion of Rome. Although we do not know Victor Emmanuel’s true motivations
– be it fear of civil war or a calculated intention to cooperate with Mussolini – we find it implausible that
the decision would have been made without the brutality of the Bienno Nero and the imminent threat of
the march on Rome. Thus, we conclude that the informal rules of accessing the premiership were altered
sufficiently to constitute regime change.
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Figure 5: Relative frequency of all modes of regime change (v3regendtype), across the period
1789–2016
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of 0.3) on the annualized relative frequencies, i.e., the share of extant regimes that experi-
enced breakdown associated with a particular mode. Notably, regime deaths associated with
these modes have, historically, moved in wave-like fashions. Concerning regime breakdowns
due to interstate wars, the early period around the French Revolutionary- and Napoleonic
wars and the mid-1900s with the end of WWII, were high-water marks. Smaller wave tops
occur around the 1860s and 70s and after WWI. For coups, the 1960s and 70s stand out
as a high-frequency period, and regime-ending coups have rapidly declined in more recent
decades, as observed by several scholars (e.g., Powell and Thyne, 2011). Yet, a focus on the
declining trend in the post-colonial era misses that coups were also relatively frequent in the
1840s and 50s and in the 1930s, but notably less frequent at the turn of both the 18th and
19th centuries. For uprisings, peaks occur around 1848 and during the 1920s, and uprisings
have increased in relative frequency to almost similar levels over the last decade. Hence, our
long time series highlight that also this mode of breakdown has moved in a non-monotonic
fashion, a nuance that is easy to overlook when focusing on the recent positive trend in
regime changes stemming from popular uprisings (e.g., Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2014).
Likewise, guided liberalization peaked around and after the end of the Cold War, but also
the 1820s and 1860s were notable high-water marks.
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Figure 6: Yearly frequencies of regime deaths (Loess smoother, span of 0.3) due to coups,
uprisings, international war, and guided liberalization, 1789–2016.
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The multiple selection variable, v3regendtypems, is often identical to v3regendtype, in-
dicating that one type of process was the dominant force behind the regime’s breakdown.
In other cases, singling out only one relevant process is difficult, for example when a regime
breaks down after being faced by a large popular revolt that is subsequently followed by a
military coup. If so, we make a decision, informed by the sources, on which of the two were
relatively more influential behind removing the regime for v3regendtype, but code both as
relevant for v3regendtypems.
Finally, we note that the nature of the processes leading to regime breakdown sometimes
are susceptible to controversy among historians and other experts.9 Take, for example, the
regime death prior to the inclusion of Montenegro in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes in 1918. Montenegro had been occupied by Allied and Serbian forces in the final
stages of WWI. On 24-26 November, the Podgorica Assembly voted to unite Montenegro
with the Kingdom under Prince-regent Aleksandar of the Karadjordjevic dynasty. Yet,
the Podgorica Assembly has been widely criticized for not including representatives from a
sufficiently broad segment of Montenegrins (Andrijasˇevic´ and Rastoder, 2006; Roberts, 2007).
Thus, deciding whether this is a directed and willed transition (category 10) or a result of
foreign intervention by Serbia (category 7) is unavoidably controversial. For v3regendtype,
9One recurring and difficult distinction is between directed transitions and self-coups; see Appendix G.
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we code this as a directed transition. But, the controversy is recognized in the accompanying
notes and in the coding of v3regendtypems.
4 Extant studies on determinants of regime breakdown
The vast literature on why regimes break down suggests determinants related to international-
systemic, geographical, demographic, cultural, economic, and political-institutional factors.
We focus on three key determinants, two economic and one political-institutional, which are
also the focus of our empirical analysis. We start by discussing two widely assumed struc-
tural conditions for regime breakdown, namely income level and level of democracy, before
we turn to a prominent “trigger”, economic crisis.
One important strand of research has considered how “economic development” condi-
tions regime change, notably including classic studies of democratization. Lipset (1959), for
instance, proposed that the societal changes following economic development would, over
time, undermine the legitimacy of autocratic regimes and make them struggle to govern
effectively, ultimately spurring transition towards democracy. Yet, several recent studies fail
to find a clear link between development, operationalized as GDP per capita, and democ-
ratizing regime changes (e.g., Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Acemoglu, 2008). Subsequent
studies have, however, questioned these recent null-results, for instance highlighting that
results from the post-WWII era are not generalizable to earlier time periods (Boix, 2011).
Further, when disaggregating the process of democratization, Kennedy (2010) finds that the
aggregate null-relationship stems from a high income level stabilizing all types of regimes –
both autocratic and democratic – but that when an autocratic regime first breaks down, it is
much more likely to be replaced by a democracy in rich countries. There are different reasons
for why high income may stabilize not only democracies, but also autocratic regimes, includ-
ing reduced poverty-related grievances and an improved availability of financial resources
that the regime can leverage for repression or co-optation. The expectation that income
stabilizes all types of regimes is, to some extent, backed up by extant findings on revolutions
(Knutsen, 2014), one common mode of regime breakdown, and the relationship between low
income levels and civil war onset is even more robust (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Yet,
studies assessing the link between income and coups d’e´tat in recent decades (Powell, 2012;
Gassebner, Gutmann and Voigt, 2016) do not find a clear association.
Other accounts of regime breakdown have focused on political institutions.10 Notably,
10Institutional features proposed to stabilize autocratic regimes include electoral institutions (e.g., Gandhi
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different studies find that regimes “in the middle” of the autocracy–democracy spectrum,
i.e. regimes displaying some combination of democratic and autocratic features, are more
likely to break down than relatively autocratic- and relatively democratic regimes (e.g.,
Gates et al., 2006; Goldstone et al., 2010; Knutsen and Nyg˚ard, 2015). One proposed reason
for why mixed regimes are less stable, is that they, unlike autocracies, are unable to suffi-
ciently repress and deter regime opposition, while they are also, unlike democracies, unable
to accommodate opposition groups through institutionalized channels of influence and com-
petition over positions of power. A related literature (e.g., Hegre et al., 2001) has found that
mixed regimes more often experience civil war (but, see Vreeland, 2008), whereas Bodea,
Elbadawi and Houle (2017) find that (certain types of) mixed regimes experience more riots
and coups d’e´tat.
Regarding triggers of regime breakdown, the “revolutionary-threat” thesis, formalized by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), emphasize sudden shocks in the capacity of the opposition
to mobilize and threaten the regime from the outside. Revolutionary threats seem to have
prompted democratization in several European countries in the 19th and early 20th centuries
(Aidt and Jensen, 2014), either directly through revolution or indirectly through “forcing”
the regime to liberalize in a guided manner. One key shock that may trigger revolts is eco-
nomic crisis (e.g., Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). While economic
crises come in different forms, a sharp drop in economic growth is a typical characteristic.
Crises may induce grievances among opposition groups and key regime supporters through
loss of income (and employment), but also through reduced public revenue leading to less
transfers through social policies (Ponticelli and Voth, 2011) or patronage (Bratton and van de
Walle, 1997). Due to their relatively sudden and public nature, economic crises may also
function as “coordination signals” (see Kuran, 1989) for opposition actors, enabling collective
action directed towards the regime. Hence, different studies show that crises, often proxied
by slow/negative economic growth, are strongly correlated with regime breakdown or more
specific processes associated with breakdown. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) find that eco-
nomic crises spur both democratization and democratic breakdown (see also Kennedy, 2010;
Ciccone, 2011; Aidt and Leon, 2015). Low short-term growth also predicts civil wars (Hegre
and Sambanis, 2006), riots and protests (Ponticelli and Voth, 2011), revolutions (Knutsen,
and Lust-Okar, 2009; Knutsen, Nyg˚ard and Wig, 2017), legislatures (e.g., Gandhi, 2008; Boix and Svolik,
2013), and strong regime parties (e.g., Geddes, 1999; Magaloni, 2008). Studies on democratic breakdown
suggest that a parliamentary (rather than presidential) system (e.g., Linz, 1990) or simply having a strong
parliament capable of monitoring and reviewing executive actions (e.g., Fish, 2006) reduce chances of break-
down, reflecting that self-coups by chief executives is a common process behind why democracies die (e.g.,
Svolik, 2008).
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2014), and coups (Gassebner, Gutmann and Voigt, 2016).
5 Correlates of regime duration and breakdown
To assess the relevance of the three discussed determinants we employ a parsimonious model
of regime breakdown. Income is measured by (logged, PPP-adjusted) GDP per capita from
(Fariss et al., 2017). Annual GDP per capita growth is also constructed from these data.
(Fariss et al., 2017) provide estimates of income (and population) by drawing on information
from different historic and contemporary sources and using a dynamic latent trait model.
We use their estimates benchmarked in the long-time series data from the Maddison project.
One benefit of using these data is the reduction of various types of measurement errors,
but also the estimation of missing values and extended time series. We further include the
Polyarchy index (Teorell et al., 2016) of (electoral) democracy from V-Dem (Coppedge et
al 2017a), and its squared term, to investigate the anticipated inverted u-curve relationship
between level of democracy and regime breakdown. Since Polyarchy is also extended back in
time by Historical V-Dem, the time frame of our analysis ranges from 1789 to recent years.
The baseline estimator is a logit model that incorporates duration dependence, capturing
time since last regime change in addition to its squared and cubed terms, following Carter and
Signorino (2010) – regimes are typically more fragile in their early stages, and regime fragility
is a non-linear function of regime duration (Svolik, 2012). We also includes fixed effects on
either regions or countries to pick up stable, unit-specific characteristics (e.g., geographic
or climatic features) that affect breakdown and correlate with the three determinants. We
further include year-dummies to model common global shocks. As discussed, various modes
of regime breakdown have evolved in wave-like patterns over time, implying that a linear
trend would be unsuitable. Finally, we control for log population from (from Fariss et al.,
2017).
Table 2 displays variations of our baseline model with regime breakdown, measured one
year after the covariates, as the outcome. The purpose of the first two models is to assess
how sensitive results are to measurement choices. Model 1.1 employs GWF data for the
dependent variable and Model 1.2 employs HRD data. As discussed, the conceptualization
of what constitutes a regime is quite similar across the two datasets, although there are
differences in operational rules, notably with HRD employing a lower threshold for conting
regime change. To make results comparable, we estimate these models on the same sample,
covering 7246 country-years from 1946–2013.
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Table 2: Logit models with regime breakdown (in t + 1) as dependent variable
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4)
GWF (1946–2013) HRD (1946–2013) HRD (1789–2014) HRD (1789–2014)
Democracy 14.793*** 9.130*** 5.007*** 6.685***
(7.00) (6.09) (7.32) (7.05)
Democracy2 -21.591*** -13.237*** -8.198*** -10.298***
(-7.23) (-7.02) (-9.66) (-9.48)
L(GDP p.c.) -0.325* -0.257** -0.178** -0.162
(-2.54) (-2.87) (-3.00) (-1.70)
L(population) -0.067 -0.014 -0.034 -0.250*
(-0.98) (-0.33) (-1.27) (-2.14)
GDP p.c. growth -0.046* -0.042* -0.015** -0.012*
(-2.20) (-2.14) (-2.92) (-2.18)
Duration terms
Region-FE
Country-FE
Year-FE
N 7246 7246 16435 16213
ll -1047.489 -1370.092 -3630.412 -3499.973
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001, standard errors are clustered at the country-level. Z-values in
parentheses. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Constant, fixed effects, and regime-specific
time trends (duration, duration2, duration3) omitted from table.
Several clear patterns emerge from Model 1.1 using GWF: High income levels and high
short-term growth are both negatively related to probability of regime breakdown. Further,
regimes “in the middle” of the autocracy–democracy spectrum are more likely to experi-
ence breakdown, as indicated by the positive linear term and negative squared term. The
results are very similar in Model 1.2 using HRD. While the coefficient for GDP per capita is
moderately reduced, the t-value actually changes from −2.5 to −2.9, further solidifying the
conclusion that regimes are less likely to die in richer countries. The result for short-term
growth stays basically unchanged, whereas the linear and squared Polyarchy terms are re-
duced in size – suggesting a somewhat less sharp inverse “U-curve” between democracy level
and probability of regime breakdown. Thus, the main conclusion drawn from comparing 1.1
and 1.2 is that the choice of GWF vs HRD regime coding does not strongly influence the
substantive interpretations on how income, growth, and democracy level influence regime
breakdown. (This does, of course, not imply that results will be similar for other covariates
than those we have tested.)
Still, the main advantage of the HRD data relative to GWF is the vastly expanded time
series, extending back to 1789 instead of 1946. Leveraging these longer time series improves
our ability to assess how robust, for instance, level of democracy and income level are as
general determinants of regime breakdown. There are strong a priori reasons to believe that
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these relationships have varied substantially across time, including developments in potential
moderating factors related, e.g., to the structure of the international political system and
communications- and military technology over the course of modern history. Model 1.3
represents the same specification as Model 1.2, but extends the time frame to 1789–2014
(16,435 country-year observations). Surprisingly, the results turn out very similar when
employing the extended time series. Low income levels, slow growth, and intermediate levels
of democracy are clearly associated with enhanced risk of regime breakdown. While there
certainly are changes to the point estimates, the key take-away from comparing Models 1.2
and 1.3 is that standard errors are (often substantially) reduced. For instance, the growth
coefficient is now more precisely estimated, with a t-value of −2.9 instead of −2.1, despite
the point estimate being reduced from −0.042 to −0.015.
While accounting for country-specific effects is often crucial for mitigating omitted vari-
able bias, it is also often regarded as infeasible in analysis of regime change, and other
infrequently occurring phenomena such as wars, when time series are limited (Beck and
Katz, 2001). Luckily, the long time series and multiple, recorded regime changes for most
countries in Model 1.3 opens up to accounting for country-specific historical factors without
being too worried about loss of efficiency. Thus, Model 1.4 substitutes region-fixed effects
with country-fixed effects. Polyarchy and growth remain stable, while the coefficient for in-
come level decreases somewhat and loses statistical precision (t = 1.70). Hence, some of the
differences in breakdown risk between rich and poor countries relates to between-country
variation, and we should therefore not conclude too forcefully on whether income affects
breakdown.
5.1 Extensions: Investigating heterogeneity across modes of break-
down and across time
So far, we have highlighted how HRD’s extensive coverage allows us to more carefully assess
the robustness of proposed determinants of regime change, for instance by controlling for
country-fixed effects. However, the specific measures and extensive time series in HRD also
open up for assessing different forms of heterogeneity. We start out by assessing whether
the predictors discussed above are differently linked to different modes of regime breakdown;
the models in Table 3 leverage the v3regendtype coding, distinguishing between four modes
These are coups (military coups and coups by others, combined), inter-state war, popular
uprising, and “guided transformation” (combining the two categories for guided liberalization
and other guided transformation).
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Table 3: Logit models with different modes of regime breakdown (in t + 1) as dependent
variable
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4)
Outcome: Coup Uprising War Reform
Democracy 7.308*** 3.843 -4.749* 13.402***
(5.00) (1.19) (-2.03) (7.03)
Democracy2 -10.566*** -12.276* 3.459 -17.950***
(-5.36) (-2.29) (1.30) (-7.64)
L(GDP p.c.) -0.212 -0.658*** 0.155 -0.013
(-1.49) (-3.30) (0.58) (-0.11)
L(population) 0.003 0.245* -0.107 0.035
(0.05) (2.41) (-0.97) (0.51)
GDP p.c. growth -0.009** -0.015* -0.014 0.010
(-2.82) (-2.07) (-1.92) (1.91)
Region-FE
Year-FE
Duration terms
N 12404 3929 2292 9582
ll -1224.189 -259.232 -301.091 -715.131
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001, standard errors are clustered at the country-level. Z-scores in
parentheses. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Constant, fixed effects, and regime-specific
time trends (duration, duration2, duration3) omitted from table.
Model 2.1, Table 3 replicates Model 1.3, Table 2, but estimates the risk of experiencing
a regime change through coups. Overall, these models report quite similar results. Regimes
with intermediate levels of democracy are more prone to break down because of coups,
and there is a negative and significant coefficient for short-term growth. Income level also
has a similarly signed point estimate as in Model 1.3, but the t-value is only -1.5. Model
2.2 estimates the risk of breakdown due to popular uprisings, also showing similarly signed
coefficients as for the (overall) regime breakdown model. Yet, the inverse-u shape relationship
with democracy is less clear than for breakdowns overall or for coup-breakdowns. In contrast,
low income level has a much stronger relationship to uprisings than coups, and economic
crises are also clearly linked to breakdowns emanating from popular uprisings. Model 2.3
considers regime breakdowns due to inter-state war. Here, we find very little similarity with
Model 1.3 on all breakdowns. Neither income levels nor intermediate levels of democracy
are strong predictors of war-induced transitions, and short-term growth is only a weakly
significant predictor (t = −1.92). Finally, Model 2.4 investigates guided regime transitions.
Here, only democracy level is a clear predictor, with regimes “in the middle” being more
likely to engage in guided regime transitions.
In sum, we identify a fair amount of heterogeneity concerning which predictors explain
different modes of breakdown. While an intermediate level of democracy is related to break-
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downs via coups or guided regime transitions, it does not systematically relate to a higher
probability of war-induced transitions. Economic crises – as proxied by GDP per capita
growth – increase the chances of transitions via coups and uprisings, but not guided regime
transitions. In contrast, low levels of income are only clearly relevant for breakdowns spurred
by popular uprisings.
Next, we investigate heterogeneity across time, returning to the dependent variable cap-
turing all forms of regime transitions (similar investigations of temporal heterogeneity for
coup- and uprising transitions, counted separately, are briefly presented in Appendix I).
Whereas the literature has focused on the question of whether democratization episodes
occur in “waves” (e.g., Huntington, 1991), one understudied question is whether there are
marked “waves” also in the stability/breakdown of regimes, more generally. Are there certain
periods of modern history with a sustained and statistically marked uptick in the frequency
of regime breakdowns, followed by “crests” where breakdowns are less frequent?
To systematically study such structural breaks in the frequency of regime change, we
estimate a Bayesian change point model on average number of regime breakdowns (across
all polities, in a given year), using Markov Chain Monte Carlo.11
Using this procedure, we identify four structural breaks in the global frequency of regime
breakdowns. We observe two “waves”, the first from 1798–1881 and the second from 1913–
1995, both followed by two crest periods where the global frequency of breakdowns drops
substantially. Figure 7 shows the posterior probability of each structural period (top), and
the global mean of breakdown frequency (with structural break-years inserted; bottom). The
identified change points are not without intuitive sense: Starting in 1798 (during the French
Revolutionary Wars), the world observed a range of regime transitions, for instance with
several occurring in German and Italian states invaded by (or allied with) France during the
ensuing Napoleonic wars. While the number of transitions tailed off after the Congress of
Vienna in 1815, the dip is insufficient for our model to identify a significant change point.
The number of transitions then increased again, notably with the European revolutions and
11Following the specification used by Knutsen and Nyg˚ard (2015), we run a linear Gaussian model, with
multiple change points defined by the user, where the posterior likelihood we sample from is:
yt = xtβt + I(st = i)t, i = 1, ..., k (1)
where k is the number of “states” (or change points + 1), I(st = i) is an indicator function that equals 1 in
state t and 0 otherwise, x is the set of covariates (we do not employ any in this analysis), and  is a stochastic
error. We set the prior mean of β to the empirical mean over the entire sample, and the prior standard
deviation of β to the empirical standard deviation. We conduct tests looking for 2, 3, 4 or 5 structural
breaks, and find that 4 change points yields the best fit to the data.
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Figure 7: Results from Change Point model
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Table 4: Logit models of regime breakdown (in t+1) in Wave and Crest periods
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6)
Period: 1798-1881 1881-1913 1913-1995 1995-2014 Wave periods Crest periods
Wave/Crest Wave I Crest I Wave II Crest II Waves I-II Crests I-II
Democracy 1.249 1.938 6.940*** 5.323* 4.926*** 5.876***
(0.56) (0.78) (7.25) (1.96) (6.13) (4.32)
Democracy2 -9.559 -6.232 -10.298*** -7.242* -8.179*** -8.818***
(-1.86) (-1.56) (-8.21) (-2.24) (-7.85) (-5.51)
L(GDP p.c.) -0.023 -0.390* -0.283*** -0.389* -0.132* -0.354**
(-0.19) (-2.15) (-3.75) (-2.44) (-2.06) (-2.78)
L(population) -0.040 -0.207* -0.018 0.038 -0.040 -0.032
(-0.52) (-2.22) (-0.56) (0.51) (-1.35) (-0.51)
GDP p.c. growth -0.002 -0.008 -0.014* -0.020 -0.015** -0.021
(-0.04) (-0.43) (-2.50) (-1.34) (-2.72) (-1.58)
Region-FE
Year-FE
Duration terms
N 2505 1573 8797 2366 11362 4758
AIC 1368.264 754.503 4416.606 777.265 5861.096 1691.623
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001, standard errors are clustered at the country-level. Z-scores in
parentheses. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Constant, fixed effects, and regime-specific
time trends (duration, duration2, duration3) omitted from table.
counter-revolutions of 1848/9, but also numerous coups in Latin American countries in the
following decades. Only after the First Boer War in 1881 (with the Congress of Berlin
coming three years later) – during a period of peace in Europe where major powers carved
up the world into colonies – there is a lull in the number of breakdowns. This lull lasts
until right before the peace in Europe is broken (1913) with WWI. From 1913-1995, there
is again a long, high-intensity period of regime breakdowns that encapsulates the inter-war
period, WWII, the de-colonization of Africa and Asia, and the Cold War – all global events
associated with numerous regime changes. After the end of the Cold War, and the ensuing
breakdown of (Communist and other) long-standing autocracies especially in Eastern Europe
and Sub-Saharan Africa, our model suggests that we entered a new crest period around 1995.
How well does our baseline model explain variation in regime change in these different
wave- and crest-periods? Table 4 shows our baseline model estimated on samples split by
the different wave and crest periods identified in figure 7. While the coefficient sizes and
significance levels vary somewhat across the periods, the signs of the coefficients are consistent
for democracy level, income level, and short-term growth. The results are, however, more
precisely estimated for the second wave 1913–1995 (which also contains the highest number
of observations), whereas none of the predictors are significant at 5% for the first wave from
1798–1881. When merging the wave (Model 3.5) and crest (3.6) periods together, we find
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that intermediate levels of democracy and low income level are positively related to regime
breakdown in both types periods, although the income coefficient is much more sizeable
during crests. For short-term growth, the coefficient size is fairly similar across wave and
crest periods, but only statistically significant at conventional levels during waves.
6 Conclusion
We chart the breakdown of political regimes globally across more than two centuries by using
our new and comprehensive HRD dataset. These data include information on more than
1900 regimes from 197 polities, recording, for example, the precise duration and mode of
breakdown of these regimes. These data will help future efforts to study the life and death
of regimes, and various forms of regime transitions, in a systematic manner.
Drawing on this dataset we have described various patterns of regime duration and break-
down throughout modern history and investigated three proposed determinants of regime
change. We find fairly robust evidence that regimes in poor countries, countries that expe-
rience slow short-term growth, and regimes that display intermediate levels of democracy
are more likely to suffer regime breakdown. All of these relationships are particularly clear
when focusing on the period from the beginning of WWI to after the end of the Cold War,
a period of modern history characterized by frequent regime changes. When investigating
distinct modes of regime breakdown, however, we find indications of heterogeneity – some
predictors are more relevant for certain modes of breakdown than others. For instance, in-
termediate levels of democracy are associated with more regime breakdowns due to coups
and guided regime transformations, whereas low short-term growth is associated with regime
deaths due to coups and popular uprisings. While we note that further theory development
and additional testing is required before we can say anything definite about heterogeneity
in relationships, be it across time or modes of breakdown, our study has illustrated how the
new HRD data enables such nuanced studies.
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These appendices contain additional information about the Historical Regimes Data
(HRD) and some additional analyses not reported in the paper. More specifically, Ap-
pendix A lists all country-polity observations included in HRD as well as the wording of
all the questions that were coded. Appendix B provides an overview of the data collection
process and the division of labor within the team. Appendix C exemplifies the coding by
presenting timelines as well as coding notes for a selected number of countries. Appendix D
clarifies the use of the interregnum period coding in HRD.
The following appendices discuss key heuristics devised for the coding. Appendix E lists
a number of events that are commonly used to identify candidates for regime breakdown as
well as the thresholds applied for coding regime change and not for these events. Appendix
F brings up, and specifies, the discussion of what to count as a “substantial change” to both
formal and informal rules for leadership selection and maintenance, and goes through the key
rules-of-thumb for determining this for the different regime end type categories. Appendix G
clarifies and illustrates the considerations made when distinguishing between the three regime
change categories that pertain to directed transitions or self-coups. Appendix H clarifies how
the units (polities and their time series) are defined, and goes through different scenarios of
regime change coding when polities merge or split up, including cases of decolonization.
Finally, Appendix I briefly illustrates results from a Bayesian change point model exercise,
similar to that presented in the paper for all regime breakdowns, focusing only on regime
breakdowns due to popular uprisings or only on regime breakdowns due to coups.
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A Questions and observations included in HRD
This appendix first lists the questions coded in HRD. Table A-1 at the end provides an
overview of the polity-years included in the dataset. While HRD takes the definitions of
country-units and time series from (Historical) V-Dem as its point of departure, please note
that regimes that came to power before the start of the V-Dem time series, but controlled
power at the first day of these time series, are also coded all the way back to the date the
regime started.
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Regime interregnum (v3regint)
Question: Does there exist an identifiable political regime?
Clarification: This question is used to identify so-called interregnum periods, where no
political regime is in control over the entity. Different types of political situations can lead
to periods of time under which there is no identifiable political regime, one example being a
civil war in which none of the parties have clear control over political bodies and processes
in the country. However, the interregnum coding is employed conservatively, meaning that
partial control over political bodies and processes in fairly large parts of the country (which
is often the case also during civil wars) is sufficient for a 0 score.
0. Yes
1. No
Regime name (v3regname)
Question: What is the name of this regime?
Clarification: If the regime is commonly referred to with a particular name in the
international literature, such as “The Second French Republic”, then this name should be
used. The exception to this rule is if the regime is only referred to by the name of the nation
(e.g. “North Korean regime”). If multiple names are used interchangeably in the literature,
select one of them. If there is no common name, try to provide a name that would be
informative to scholars that have knowledge of the political history of the relevant country.
If the time period in question is characterized by a so-called interregnum period, where no
political regime is coded, please provide the name “Interregnum X-Y”, where X denotes the
country and Y denotes the order (in time) of this interregnum period among all such periods
(within the coded time series) for this particular country. E.g., the first coded interregnum
period of Spain should be coded “Interregnum Spain-1”.
Answer type: Text
Regime start date (v3regstartdate)
Question: When did the political regime obtain power?
Answer type: Day/Month/Year
iv
Regime end date (v3regenddate)
Question: When did the political regime lose power?
Answer type: Day/Month/Year
Regime end type (v3regendtype)
Question: Could you specify the types of processes (one or more) that led to the end of
the regime?
0. A military coup d’etat.
1. A coup d’e´tat conducted by other groups than the military.
2. A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader.
3. Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d’e´tat)
4. Natural death of the sitting leader
5. Loss in civil war.
6. Loss in inter-state war.
7. Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war)
8. Popular uprising.
9. Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by
sitting regime leaders
10. Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under
the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization)
11. Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime
leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the
sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1 to 10
12. Other process than those specified by categories 0 to 11.
13. Regime still exists
Answer type: Single selection
Regime end type, multiple selection (v3regendtypems)
Question: Could you specify the type of process that you consider the most important
in leading to the end of the regime?
v
0. A military coup d’etat.
1. A coup d’e´tat conducted by other groups than the military.
2. A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader.
3. Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d’e´tat)
4. Natural death of the sitting leader
5. Loss in civil war.
6. Loss in inter-state war.
7. Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war)
8. Popular uprising.
9. Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by
sitting regime leaders
10. Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under
the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization)
11. Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime
leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the
sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1 to 10
12. Other process than those specified by categories 0 to 11.
13. Regime still exists
Answer type: Multiple selection
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Country Start year End year Country Start year End year
Afghanistan 1747 2016 Lithuania 1918 2016
Albania 1912 2016 Luxembourg 1714 2016
Algeria 1830 2016 Macedonia 1991 2016
Angola 1885 2016 Madagascar 1797 2016
Argentina 1776 2016 Malawi 1891 2016
Armenia 1922 2016 Malaysia 1867 2016
Australia 1788 2016 Maldives 1887 2016
Austria 1713 2016 Mali 1890 2016
Azerbaijan 1922 2016 Mauritania 1904 2016
Baden 1112 1871 Mauritius 1818 2016
Bangladesh 1971 2016 Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1755 1871
Barbados 1663 2016 Mexico 1784 2016
Bavaria 1623 1871 Modena 1780 1861
Belarus 1991 2016 Moldova 1991 2016
Belgium 1785 2016 Mongolia 1911 2016
Benin 1895 2016 Montenegro 1785 2016
Bhutan 1865 2016 Morocco 1757 2016
Bolivia 1784 2016 Mozambique 1836 2016
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 2016 Namibia 1884 2016
Botswana 1885 2016 Nassau 1806 1866
Brazil 1763 2016 Nepal 1768 2016
Brunswick 1495 1918 Netherlands 1747 2016
Bulgaria 1877 2016 New Zealand 1823 2016
Burkina Faso 1919 2016 Nicaragua 1823 2016
Burma/Myanmar 1782 2016 Niger 1922 2016
Burundi 1897 2016 Nigeria 1914 2016
Cambodia 1863 2016 Norway 1784 2016
Cameroon 1960 2016 Oldenburg 1774 1871
Canada 1838 2016 Oman 1749 2016
Cape Verde 1879 2016 Pakistan 1947 2016
Central African Republic 1920 2016 Panama 1903 2016
Chad 1914 2016 Papal States 1775 1870
Chile 1787 2016 Papua New Guinea 1888 2016
China 1722 2016 Paraguay 1776 2016
Colombia 1717 2016 Parma 1748 1861
Comoros 1841 2016 Peru 1543 2016
Congo, Democratic Republic of 1885 2016 Philippines 1898 2016
Congo, Republic of the 1882 2016 Poland 1764 2016
Costa Rica 1823 2016 Portugal 1777 2016
Croatia 1941 2016 Prussia 1701 1871
Cuba 1763 2016 Qatar 1916 2016
Cyprus 1878 2016 Romania 1789 2016
Czech Republic 1918 2016 Russia 1762 2016
Denmark 1784 2016 Rwanda 1897 2016
Djibouti 1896 2016 Sao Tome´ and Prncipe 1753 2016
Dominican Republic 1700 2016 Sardinia 1720 1861
East Germany 1949 1990 Saudi-Arabia/Nejd 1744 2016
East Timor 1896 2016 Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach 1741 1871
Ecuador 1819 2016 Saxony 1356 1871
Egypt 1787 2016 Senegal 1904 2016
El Salvador 1823 2016 Serbia 1730 2016
Eritrea 1896 2016 Seychelles 1903 2016
Estonia 1918 2016 Sierra Leone 1896 2016
Ethiopia/Abyssinia 1769 2016 Singapore 1867 2016
Fiji 1874 2016 Slovakia 1939 2016
Finland 1789 2016 Slovenia 1991 2016
France 1768 2016 Solomon Islands 1893 2017
Gabon 1920 2016 Somalia 1889 2016
Gambia 1888 2017 Somaliland 1888 2016
Georgia 1922 2016 South Africa 1884 2016
Germany 1867 2016 South Sudan 2011 2016
Ghana 1901 2016 South Yemen 1839 1990
Greece 1821 2016 Spain 1700 2016
Guatemala 1697 2016 Sri Lanka 1815 2016
Guinea 1895 2016 Sudan 1899 2016
Guinea-Bissau 1879 2016 Suriname 1816 2016
Guyana 1831 2016 Swaziland 1890 2016
Haiti 1697 2016 Sweden 1789 2016
Hamburg 1712 1871 Switzerland 1712 2016
Hanover 1803 1866 Syria 1918 2016
Hesse-Darmstadt 1567 1871 Taiwan 1895 2016
Hesse-Kassel 1567 1866 Tajikistan 1991 2016
Honduras 1823 2016 Tanzania 1916 2016
Hungary 1722 2016 Thailand 1782 2016
Iceland 1814 2016 Togo 1916 2016
India 1784 2016 Trinidad and Tobago 1889 2016
Indonesia 1800 2016 Tunisia 1782 2016
Iran/Persia 1751 2016 Turkey/Ottoman Empire 1730 2017
Iraq 1920 2016 Turkmenistan 1991 2016
Ireland 1801 2016 Tuscany 1737 1861
Italy 1861 2016 Two Sicilies 1759 1861
Ivory Coast 1895 2016 Uganda 1894 2016
Jamaica 1670 2016 Ukraine 1991 2016
Japan 1615 2016 United Arab Emirates 1971 2016
Jordan 1921 2016 United Kingdom 1701 2016
Kazakhstan 1991 2016 United States 1788 2016
Kenya 1895 2016 Uruguay 1825 2016
Korea, North 1945 2016 Uzbekistan 1785 2016
Korea, South 1637 2016 Vanuatu 1906 2016
Kosovo 1999 2016 Venezuela 1777 2016
Kuwait 1756 2016 Vietnam 1771 1945
Kyrgyzstan 1991 2016 Vietnam, North 1945 2016
Laos 1893 2016 Vietnam, South 1945 1975
Latvia 1918 2016 Wu¨rttemberg 1089 1871
Lebanon 1918 2016 Yemen 1716 2016
Lesotho 1884 2016 Zambia 1911 2016
Liberia 1821 2016 Zanzibar 1698 2016
Libya/Tripolitania 1711 2016 Zimbabwe 1890 2016
Liechtenstein 1866 2016
Table A-1: Observations included in HRD
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B An overview of the data collection process
Several scholars (from the Historical V-Dem team) were involved in the deliberation and
revision of the questions and definitions employed for the Historical Regime Data (HRD),
after they had been originally formulated by the second author of this article. The broader
operational criteria guiding the data collection were intentionally designed to reflect the
conceptual regime definition discussed in the paper. To recapitulate, a regime is defined
according to the formal or informal rules for the selection and maintenance of political
leaders in power.
Regarding the actual data collection, the second and third authors started by producing
first drafts of the more specific coding guidelines and lists of operational criteria for the
coding. They thereafter trial-coded a subset of eight (quite diverse) countries. They there-
after revised the coding scheme based on observations made during the trial coding, and
recruited and coordinated the RAs’ coding in a hands-on manner early on (another round of
specifications of the operational criteria was conducted while and after the three RAs that
were first recruited had completed their first batches of countries).
In the end, the first author of the article – originally one of the three first recruited
RAs – conducted the main bulk of the coding, which lasted for about two years in total.
The observations coded by the first author includes all coding for 1920–2016 for all polities
(except for double-coding related to inter-coder reliability tests), in addition to a substantial
part of the historical coding. She also trained additional RA coders and quality-controlled
the coding of the other coders to enhance internal consistency, before “hard decisions” were
passed on to the second and third author of the article. One important strategy in this
regard was the explicit instruction given to all RAs that they should provide alternative
codings, with full documentation for all alternative solutions, whenever in doubt on how to
delineate the regime units. Typically, this would entail a more “liberal” coding, with one
or more regime changes throughout a given time interval, as well as a more “conservative”
coding where the entire time interval was covered by one regime. At the end of the historical
coding and then again at the end of the coding for 1920–2016, the second and third authors
would separately read through all these “liberal”/“conservative” codings, identify and read
through additional source material if needed. The two authors would then make suggestions
for decisions to these cases, with a particular focus on applying the rules so that cross-time
and cross-country consistency was ensured, and meet for deliberations. In the very few cases
were the two authors were unable to land on a joint decision, they would bring in the relevant
RA for discussions and, if needed, ask the RA to go back to/identify more sources before
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settling the issue. More generally, internal consistency was also enhanced by continuous
discussions between the authors and the RAs (and between the RAs), especially on how to
settle dates, types of breakdown, and delineating regimes for tricky cases.
Among the RA coders, other than the first author, four focused on their respective
batches of countries for the 1789–1920 period, with, e.g., one (Italian) RA coding Italian pre-
unification states and one (German) RA coding German pre-unification states. All coders
have drawn on several sources – mainly country-specific sources in the form of monographs
written by historians or political scientists, research articles, or encyclopedias, but also cross-
country sources such as the existing regime datasets listed in the article – to inform their
coding decisions.
The sixth RA double-coded six selected countries from Latin America across the 20th
and 21st centuries – mainly countries that we presumed to be especially hard cases – for
consistency/reliability checks. For these six countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay,
Venezuela and Nicaragua), the double-coder identified the exact regime end dates and end
types recorded by the original coder for 75 percent of the originally coded regimes (39/52).
For another 10 percent (5 regimes), the double-coder identified the regime change dates
identified by the original coder, but coded the end type differently. For the especially difficult
case of Bolivia, 16 of the original coder’s total of 22 regimes since the turn of the 20th century
were exactly identified by the double-coder. As noted in the paper, the second coder, for
instance, failed to identify two coups in the 1930s that the original coder had identified from
one particular source (Hudson and Hanratty, 1991, 28-32). The first was the regime change
following the military command’s overthrow of president Salamanca during the Chaco War
with Paraguay, leading to the instalment of his peace-seeking vice president. The second
regime begins when a group of army officers decided to back the coup led by Col. Busch to
overthrow president Toro in 1937, citing Toro’s unwillingness to challenge the tin oligarchy
as his main reason. For the more straightforward case of Costa Rica, however, the fifth coder
identified the exact same four regimes as the original coder.
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C Examples of regime coding and coding notes
In the paper, we provided an illustrative timeline of the coding of regime start- and end
dates for Iran from 1925 onwards. Figure A-1 provides several other examples, covering the
entire time series of the countries in question. At the same time, the timelines report how
the various regimes ended. Specifically, we present time lines for Serbia, China, Mexico,
France and Russia, with each regime death as recorded for the v3regendtype variable.
We then present tables with excerpts of the regime coding sheet for the set of countries
in Figure A-1. These excerpts provide a brief historical exposition and justification for, for
example, the coding of regime end dates of each regime. The full set of notes for all variables
for each country can be found at ANONYMIZED WEBPAGE.
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Serbia
1730 [8] [7]
[x]
[7] [12] [12] [6] [3] [6][6]
[10]
[2] [3] [6] [6] [11]
[10]
[10] 2017
China
1722 [7]
[10]
[1] [2] [1]
[6]
[10] [8]
[10]
[2][4]
[0]
[0][5] [5] [6] [6] [5] 2017
Mexico
1784 [1] [9]
[9]
[10] [9]
[8]
[10]
[2]
[0]
[10]
[1]
[1]
[10]
[1]
[1]
[12]
[0][0]
[0]
[10]
[6]
[10] [1]
[8]
[9]
[2]
[0]
[5]
[7]
[10]
[8] [1] [2] [8]
[10]
[0]
[5]
[5][1] [3] [9] 2017
France
1768 [8][10] [0] [10] [6] [8] [8][2] [6] [6] [6] [10] 2017
Russia
1762 [0] [8] [8]
[8]
[10] [11]
[10]
[2]2017
1722 2017
1750 1775 1800 1825 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000
Note: x = Coding gap. 0 = A military coup d’etat. 1 = A coup d’etat conducted by other groups than the military. 2 = A self-coup (autogolpe).
3 = Assassination of the sitting leader. 4 = Natural death of the sitting leader. 5 = Loss in civil war 6 = Loss in inter-state war.
7 = Foreign intervention. 8 = Popular uprising. 9 = Substantial political liberalization with guidance by sitting regime.
10 = Other type of directed transition with guidance of sitting regime. 11 = Substantial political liberalization without guidance by sitting regime. 12 = Other process.
Figure A-1: Time lines of HRD for Mexico, Russia, France, Serbia and China
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Country
name
V-Dem
code
Regime
name
v3regstartdate v3regenddate Notes to v3regenddate v3regend-
typeMS
v3regend-
type
Notes to v3regendtype Sources
Russia 11 Early Impe-
rial Russia
09/07/1762 0 23/03/1801 Military coup d’e´tat against Paul.
After Paul was killed he was re-
placed by his son, Alexander I.
0 0 Military coup d’e´tat
against Paul. After
Paul was killed he
was replaced by his
son, Alexander I.
Freeze (2002:
115-116, 141).
Moss (2005:
269, 333-334).
Encyclopedia
Britannica.
Russia 11 Late Impe-
rial Russia
23/03/1801 0 06/05/1906 The empire’s Fundamental Laws
were amended on May 6, 1906,
to take account of the Duma and
reforms promised in the October
Manifesto.
8, 9 8 Liberalization fol-
lowing the Revo-
lution of 1905-06
Freeze (2002:
215-220). Ri-
asanovsky and
Steinberg (2011:
402-405). En-
cyclopedia
Britannica.
Russia 11 Post-1906
Act
06/05/1906 0 11/03/1917 Provisional government formed by
the Duma - and thus sidestepping
an imperial dissolution decree - as
a response to the February Revo-
lution of 1917.
8, 11 8 Provisional gov-
ernment formed by
the Duma - and
thus sidestepping
an imperial disso-
lution decree - as
a response to the
February Revolution
of 1917.
Freeze (2002:
235-240). Ri-
asanovsky and
Steinberg (2011:
466-473). En-
cyclopedia
Britannica.
Russia 11 Provisional
government
11/03/1917 0 07/11/1917 The Soviets seized control of
the government in November and
drove the provisional government
into exile, in the events that later
have become known as the Octo-
ber Revolution.
8 8 Armed insurrec-
tion/uprising fol-
lowed by the disso-
lution of all vestiges
of democracy.
Freeze (2002:
247-257). Ri-
asanovsky and
Steinberg (2011:
475-477, 488).
Russia 11 Soviet
Russia
07/11/1917 0 30/12/1922 Formation of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
10 10 Formation of the
Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
Riasanovsky
and Steinberg
(2011: 500).
Encyclopedia
Britannica.
Russia 11 USSR 30/12/1922 0 31/12/1991 The U.S.S.R. legally ceased to ex-
ist on December 31, 1991.
11 11 Fall of Soviet coded
as political liber-
alization without
guidance by sitting
regime
Britannica
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Russia 11 Post-Soviet
Russia
31/12/1991 0 21/09/1993 On 21 Sept, Yeltsin issued a se-
ries of presidential decrees that
dissolved the parliament and im-
posed presidential rule that would
exist until after elections to a new
parliament and a referendum on a
new draft constitution were held.
10, 2 10 Directed transition
deemed most appro-
priate measure
Britannica
Russia 11 Russian
Federation
21/09/1993 0 04/03/2012 Putin re-elected in very widely
fraudulent elections: end of ’man-
aged democracy’
10,2 2 Directed transition,
but the development
overall deemed se-
vere enough to be
dubbed self-coup
Britannica,
Krastev and
Holmes (2012)
Russia 11 Putin’s
Russia
04/03/2012 0 E Britannica,
Krastev and
Holmes (2012)
Serbia 198 Ottoman
Empire -
Mahmud I -
Selim III
28/09/1730 1 15/12/1806 Though the first Serbian Upris-
ing started in 1804, actual seize
of Belgrade did not succeed until
1806 (Stavrianos 1963)
8 8 Popular uprising led
by Karadjordje
Britannica,
Stavrianos
2000:19-20,
Wikipedia
Serbia 198 Serbian
nationalist
uprising
15/12/1806 1 15/12/1813 Ottomans retake Belgrade 6,7 7 Coded foreign inter-
vention because the
Ottoman Empire
was ultimately de-
cisive in reclaiming
Serbia.
Britannica,
Stavrianos
1963:21-22,
Mazover 2000:83,
Wikipedia
Serbia 198 Not to be
coded
15/12/1813 1 15/04/1815
Serbia 198 The Obren-
ovich Ot-
toman
Principality
of Serbia
15/04/1815 1 01/01/1830 After a period of Russian-
Ottoman war, the Ottoman
empire granted Serbia full au-
tonomy (Britannica). Sources
disagree on the importance of
1830; Stavrianos treating 1815
as year of full autonomy, whilst
Britannica and Mazover see the
change as substantial.
7 7 Ottoman Empire
grants autonomy
Britannica,
Stavrianos
1963:21-22,
Mazover 2000:83,
Wikipedia
x
iii
Country
name
V-Dem
code
Regime
name
v3regstartdate v3regenddate Notes to v3regenddate v3regend-
typeMS
v3regend-
type
Notes to v3regendtype Sources
Serbia 198 The Obren-
ovich Au-
tonomous
Ottoman
Principality
of Serbia
01/01/1830 1 14/09/1842 National Assembly (Skupshtina)
ousts Obrenovich and elects
Karadjordje’s son Alexander
as prince of the principality.
Argument for regime change:
Britannica and Stavrianos (1963)
describe a power struggle between
supporters of the Obrenovich and
Karadjordjevich clans throughout
the period 1815-WWII.
12 12 Election in Skup-
shtina, but not
democratization -
rather represen-
tation of power
struggle between
the clans and Na-
tional Assembly
dissatisfaction with
Obrenovich.
Britannica,
Stavrianos
1963:22,
Wikipedia
Serbia 198 Karad-
jordjevic
Principality
of Serbia
14/09/1842 0 23/12/1858 The Skupshtina ousted Karad-
jordjevich in favour of Obren-
ovich.
12 12 Election in Skup-
shtina, but not
democratization -
rather represen-
tation of power
struggle between
the clans and Na-
tional Assembly
dissatisfaction with
Obrenovich.
Britannica,
Stavrianos
1963:22,
Wikipedia
Serbia 198 Obrenovic
Principality
of Serbia
23/12/1858 0 13/07/1878 The Serbs declared war against
the Ottoman Empire in 1876, and
the war was ended by first the
Treaty of San Stefano (May 1878),
and then the Treaty of Berlin
(13/07/1878) which ensured Ser-
bia complete and final indepen-
dence from the Ottoman Empire.
The Kingdom of Serbia then came
into being within the following
couple of years, and was formally
established in 1882 when Prince
Milan Obrenovich was crowned
King of Serbia (Wikipedia).
6 6 Coded loss in inter-
state war because
the Ottoman Em-
pire lost against the
Serbs and granted
autonomy in the
treaty of Berlin.
Britannica,
Stavrianos
1963:22-25,
Wikipedia
Serbia 198 Obrenovich
Kingdom of
Serbia
13/07/1878 0 15/06/1903 King Alexander Obrenovich is as-
sasinated by officers in the na-
tional assembly and Peter Karad-
jordjevic is invited to take back
the throne (Britannica). His in-
aguration marks the date.
3 3 Obrenovich is assas-
inated
Britannica,
Conley 2012
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Serbia 198 Karad-
jordjevich
Kingdom of
Serbia
15/06/1903 0 15/10/1915 In October 1915, the German gen-
eral von Mackensen launched a
third offensive, supported by the
Bulgarian army, and effectively
forced the Serbs to retreat across
Albania to the Adriatic Coast.
6 6 Loss in WWI Britannica,
Wikipedia,
Conley 2012
Serbia 198 Austrian-
Hungarian
occupation
of Serbia
15/10/1915 1 01/11/1918 Belgrade was recaptured by
British, French, Greek and Serb
forces, and Austria-Hungary
agreed to an armistice.
6 6 Loss in WWI Britannica
Serbia 198 Kingdom of
Serbia
01/11/1918 0 01/12/1918 In November 1918, the Yugoslav
Comittee had met in Geneva, fol-
lowed by Zagreb severing of ties
to Hungary and the agreement
of a Union. On 1/12/1918 the
prince regent Alexander was in-
vited to problaim the new union.
On 5 Dec, the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes was pre-
sented to the world.
10 10 The reigning Peter
I joins Serbs and
Croats in creating
the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes
Britannica,
Wikipedia
Serbia 198 Kingdom
of Serbs,
Croats and
Slovenes
01/12/1918 0 06/01/1929 King Peter I dies at the age of
77 in 1921. The 20s were then
tainted by cooperational chal-
lenges in the Skupshtina and the
conflict climaxed when the Serb
deputy Racic shot and killed three
members of the opposition Croa-
tian Peasant Party. On 6 Jan
1929, King Alexander I suspended
the constitution and established
a monarchic dictatorship with the
new name Yugoslavia (Britannica
and Wikipedia)
2 2 King Alexander I re-
acts to the turmoil
of the Skupshtina by
declaring a royal dic-
tatorship.
Britannica,
Wikipedia
Serbia 198 King
Alexan-
der’s dicta-
torship of
Yugoslavia
06/01/1929 0 09/10/1934 Alexander’s reign was only par-
tially supported and eventually
gained large opposition. When
the King was on an official visit
to France, he was assasinated on
9 Oct 1934. A regency was estab-
lished, headed by Prince Paul, the
uncle of Peter II, the heir to the
throne.
3 3 Assassination of
Alexander
Britannica,
Wikipedia,
Lampe 1996:160-
197
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Serbia 198 Kingdom of
Yugoslavia:
Prince Paul
09/10/1934 0 06/04/1941 Discussions between the Serb
leader Dragia Cvetkovi and
Croatian Peasant Party leader
Vladimir Macek resulted in the
Sporazum (Agreement) of August
1939, on the eve of World War
II, which made provision for an
enlarged, partially self-governing
Croatian banovina. Whether this
prefigured a peaceful reconcili-
ation of the Serb-Croat conflict
remains unclear, as Yugoslavia
was invaded and broken up by
Nazi Germany and its allies in
April 1941.
6 6 Loss to Axis powers
in WWII
Britannica,
Wikipedia,
Lampe 1996:160-
197
Serbia 198 German/
Italian
occupied
Yugoslavia
06/04/1941 0 12/04/1945 The occupation started to come
to an end in Serbia in 1944, and
the eventual and complete end of
occupied Yugoslavia came when
Yugoslav partisans and the Red
Army broke the Syrmian front on
12 April 1945.
6 6 Axis powers defeat
in WWII
Britannica,
Wikipedia,
Lampe 1996:223-
230
Serbia 198 SFR Yu-
goslavia
12/04/1945 0 22/01/1990 When the ruling Communist
League dissolved in January 1990,
Serbia (including the territories
of Montenegro and Kosovo) con-
tained their status as Republic
of Serbia within Yugoslavia, but
now without Communist rule.
12,11 11 The dissolution
of the Communist
League is credited to
an array of factors.
Economic inequal-
ity and decline,
popular discontent,
rising nation-
alist/separatist
sentiments and the
rise of Milosevic
all included. The
change is coded
liberalization with-
out guidance of
regime leaders be-
cause of the abrupt
dissolution of the
party - although
democracy did not
prevail in most of
the Post-Yugoslav
countries.
Britannica,
Wikipedia,
Lampe 1996:344-
345
x
v
i
Country
name
V-Dem
code
Regime
name
v3regstartdate v3regenddate Notes to v3regenddate v3regend-
typeMS
v3regend-
type
Notes to v3regendtype Sources
Serbia 198 Republic
of Serbia
within
Yugoslavia
22/01/1990 0 27/04/1992 On April 27, 1992, a new Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia was
inaugurated, comprising only Ser-
bia and Montenegro. Its capi-
tal and assembly were both placed
in Belgrade. The new state was
not recognized by the entire in-
ternational community, however,
because of its continued military
involvement in other republics of
the former Yugoslavia (Britan-
nica)
10 10 Directed transfor-
mational process
by sitting regime
leaders
Britannica,
Lampe 1996:344-
345, Blum (1992)
Serbia 198 Serbia part
of Federal
Republic of
Yugoslavia
27/04/1992 0 04/02/2003 Despite widespread support for
independence in Montenegro and
plans to hold a referendum on se-
cession in April 2002, jukanovi ne-
gotiated an agreement with Yu-
goslav and Serbian authorities in
March, calling for Montenegros
continued association with Serbia
in a virtual federation. The agree-
ment, approved by the Yugoslav
parliament and the Montenegrin
and Serbian assemblies in 2003,
renamed the country Serbia and
Montenegro, gave wide powers to
the governments of Montenegro
and Serbia, and allowed each re-
public to hold a referendum on in-
dependence and to withdraw from
the union after three years (Bri-
tannica).
10 10 Directed transfor-
mational process
by sitting regime
leaders
Britannica, Blum
(1992), enddate
from Wikipedia
Serbia 198 Confed-
eration of
Serbia and
Montenegro
04/02/2003 0 E Kosovo declares independence in
2008, but its independence is not
recognized by Serbia.
Britannica,
startdate from
Wikipedia
Mexico 3 General
Comman-
dancy of
the Internal
Provinces
01/01/1784 1 15/09/1808 On 15 September, defenders of
the Empire, mostly European
Spaniards, use force to put the
Viceroy and the supporters of
home rule in jail.
1 1 Spanish peninsulars
and their army
units assure im-
perial interests by
putting vieceregal
authorities in jail.
Considered a coup.
Guedea (2000:
277-282, 285-286)
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Mexico 3 New
Spain/Supreme
Governing
Central
Junta
15/09/1808 0 15/09/1812 An uprising sparked by the priest
Miguel Hidalgo cryout against the
rule of Spanish peninsulars leads
to a bloo, but they are not yet
able to seriously challenge the au-
thority of the colonial power. In
Septemer 1812 New Spain promul-
gates the liberal Spanish constitu-
tion of Cadiz.
9 9 New Spain promul-
gates a liberal con-
stitution drawn up
by the Cortes in
Cadiz. The consti-
tution has a direct
impa.
Guedea (2000:
286-294); Ham-
nett (1999:
134-137)
Mexico 3 1912 Con-
stitution of
Cdiz
15/09/1812 1 22/03/1814 The colonial powerholders in New
Spain adopt the constitution sig-
nifiying allegiance to Spain. But
in effect the constitution gives
opportunities for the home rule
movement to be elected to every-
thing from local councils to the
Cortes in Cadiz. Giving ayun-
tamientos formal power is a threat
to colonial rule.
10 10 Considered intended
transformational
process in which
the colonial admin-
istration follows
the decrees of the
newly reinstated
Ferdinand VII.
Guedea (2000:
292-295); Ham-
nett (1999:
139-141)
Mexico 3 New Spain
under
Viceroy Felix
Maria del
Rey/Viceroy
Juan Ruiz de
Apodaca
22/03/1814 0 15/09/1820 Efforts to organize the insurgency
endures and the condition of New
Spain runs parrallel to events tak-
ing place in Spain. A strug-
gle between constitutionalists and
royalists lead to restoration of
the constitution of 1812 in Spain.
By September 1820, the constitu-
tional system is restored in New
Spain.
9 9 The constitution
enunciates a liberal
bill of rights, and
provides for the
reestablishment of
constitutional ayun-
tamientos (munic-
ipal governments).
Considered political
liberalization.
Guedea (2000:
294-296); Meyer
and Sherman
(1995: 291-294)
Mexico 3 Constitu-
tional regime
based n con-
stitution of
1812
15/09/1820 1 28/09/1821 The disintegration of colonial
viceregal power in Mexico City,
the restoration of the constitu-
tion, turmoil in Spain and the
Cortes in Madrid’s delaying tak-
ing action on colonial questions,
lead the majority of New Spain
to desire freedom from Spain’s
volatile politics. This creates an
independence movement quite dif-
ferent from the insurgency move-
ment of 1810.
8 8 Considered popular
uprising in which
New Spaniards from
most segments of
society join in the
proclamation of
independence from
Spain.
Guedea (2000:
295-298); Meyer
and Sherman
(1995: 294-297);
Hamnett (1999:
140-143)
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Mexico 3 The Mexican
Em-
pire/Suprema
Junta Pro-
visional
Gubernativa
28/09/1821 0 19/05/1822 . In May the Mexican Cortes
convenes and chooses Iturbide as
monarch after a staged demon-
stration in Mexico City by royalist
Junta members.
10, 1 10 Could be considered
intended transfor-
mational process
by the Junta and
Congress, or an or-
chestrated coup by
followers of Iturbide.
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
294-296); Guedea
(2000: 296-301);
Hamnett (1999:
143-145)
Mexico 3 The Mexican
Empire/
Consti-
tutional
Emperor
Agustin I
19/05/1822 0 31/10/1822 The inherent contradiction in the
system leads to deepening con-
flict between Congress and the
executive. The Junta, now
dominated by conservatives in-
terests, declares itself not to be
bound by the constitution. Many
in Congress do not accomodate
themselves to the idea of monar-
chical Mexico and it is unaccept-
able to provincial and local au-
thorities. Iturbide and the Junta
start to suppress opposition, and
in October he dissolves Congress.
2 2 Considered au-
tocoup in which
Iturbide dissolves
the legislature and
gives power to
a self-appointed
Junta.
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
305-307); Archer
(2000: 316);
Hamnett (1999:
144)
Mexico 3 The Mexican
Empire/
Emperor
Agustiin I
31/10/1822 0 15/02/1823 Agustin’s arbitrary rule provides
a pretext for revolt. One of the re-
volt leaders, commander Antonio
Lpez de Santa Anna proclaim that
Mexico should become a republic,
and is joined by several provin-
cial militias, and soon also by the
General of the Imperial forces Jos
Echverri who finds common cause
with Santa Anna. Iturbide de-
cides to reconvene Congress and
abdicates in February 1823.
0 0 Coup by military Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
306-307); Archer
(2000: 316)
Mexico 3 Bravo-
Victoria-
Negrete
Provisional
Junta
15/02/1823 1 27/11/1823 The Consituent Assembly meet 27
November to draft a new constitu-
tion.
10 10 Considered intended
transformational
process in which the
Provisional Junta
hands over power
the Constituent
Assembly.
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
313-314); Archer
(2000: 316-317)
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Mexico 3 The Second
Constituent
Assembly
27/11/1823 0 04/10/1824 A moderate proposal of shared
sovereignty wins approval and the
constitution is ratified 4 October.
10 10 An intended trans-
formational process
in which the Con-
stituent Congress
adopt a constitution
that is effectively
a compromise on
the distribution of
sovereignty.
Archer (2000:
316-317); Meyer
and Sherman
(1995: 314-320)
Mexico 3 United
Mexican
States/Constitution
of 1824
04/10/1824 0 01/04/1829 General Vicente Guerrero. Pe-
draza wins more states than
Guerrero in elections, whereupon
Santa Anna declares himself in
revolt. President Victoria fails
to suppress the revolt, and when
Guerrero joins, Pedraza gives up.
1 1 Considered coup
by liberal circles
with their respective
militias. Civilian
politicians invite
military leaders for
assistance in pur-
suit of their goals
(Hamnett 1999:
145)
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
318-320); Archer
(2000: 326-327);
Hamnett (1999:
145)
Mexico 3 Presidency
of Vincente
Guerrero
01/04/1829 0 17/12/1829 In August Santa Anna confronts
the anticipated Spanish invasion
of reconquest and defeats the
Spanish. Few in Mexico can ri-
val his popularity. Guerrero him-
self fails to restore stability in
the country. Federalist-centralist
struggle continues and when a re-
volt breaks out against Guerrero,
the vice-president and many oth-
ers follow, but Santa Anna fights
on the president’s side. Bus-
tanmante succeeds to overthrow
Guerrero, largely because of his
influence with the army.
5, 1 1 Considered a coup
by centralist and
conservatives under
the vice-presidents
leadership. Could
also be considered
loss in civil war,
based on the scale
of the revolt.
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
320-321); Archer
(2000: 326-327)
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Mexico 3 Presidency
of Anastasio
Bustamante
17/12/1829 0 15/01/1833 The repressive policies of Busta-
mante brings increasing opposi-
tion, especially from the states
and from federalists in the capital.
Once again Santa Anna prepares
his troops for combat and rebels.
Confronting many uprisings and
battling several state militias,
Bustamante’s government is over-
whelmed and compelled to surren-
der.
5, 1 5 Santa Anna’s forces
manages to over-
throw Bustamante.
Could be considered
loss in civil war
because of the scale
of the uprising.
Santa Anna wins
but by a peace set-
tlement - the Plan
de Zavaleta.
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
321-322); Archer
(2000: 327-328)
Mexico 3 Plan de
Zavaleta/
Interim
Presidency
of Manuel
Gomez
Pedraza
15/01/1833 1 01/04/1833 In March the state legislatures
cast their votes. Santa Anne wins
the largest majority in Mexican
history. Valentin Gmez Farias is
chosen as vice-president.
10 10 Intended transfor-
mational process.
Peaceful handover
of power after
states cast their
presidential votes.
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
324-326); Archer
(2000: 328-330);
Bazant (1977:
47)
Mexico 3 Presidency
of Antonio
Lpez de
Santa Anna
01/04/1833 0 27/01/1835 The liberal program enrages the
clergy, the army and the conser-
vative elites and demand an end
to radical reform. Santa Anna
returns to Mexico City accepting
the argument that reforms have
gone way so far that it could lead
to civil war. He is convinced that
the Constitution of 1824 has made
Mexico ungovernable and changes
his sympathies in the wake of
Farias reforms. Santa Anna re-
moves Faris.
2, 1 1 Traditional elites,
the upper clergy
and powerful army
officers convince
Santa Anna to take
action to reestablish
the nation on cen-
tralist foundations.
In effect a shift in
the power balance
between federal-
ists and centralists
without a change
of leader. Could
be considered the
equivalent of a coup.
Or a combination of
coup and autogolpe.
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
327-328); Archer
(2000: 326-332)
x
x
i
Country
name
V-Dem
code
Regime
name
v3regstartdate v3regenddate Notes to v3regenddate v3regend-
typeMS
v3regend-
type
Notes to v3regendtype Sources
Mexico 3 Constitution
of Siete
Leyes/
Centralist
regime of
Santa Anna
27/01/1835 0 16/07/1840 The constitution reduces the au-
tonomous states with their legis-
latures to departments with gov-
ernors and councils appointed by
the central regime. The president
is to be elected indirectly to an
eight-year term. Suffrage is re-
stricted to men who earn a cer-
tain sum annually. The Texas cri-
sis and federalist uprisings, the
strongenst being in Yucatn which
desposes the governor, frustrate
centralist efforts to solidify their
system. By 1840 the centralist
regime does not possess enough
military power to control the sit-
uation. In the summer, violence
spills from the regions into Mexico
City when federalists led by Farias
and General Jos Urrea temporar-
ily arrests the then president Bus-
tamante.
5, 1 1 Coup by otehr Archer
(2000:332-335)
Mexico 3 Interregnum
Mexico 1
16/07/1840 0 22/09/1841 Desparate for a solution, conser-
vatives conclude that the only an-
swer to the chaos is to restore
Santa Anna as interim president
and impose strong centralism and
dictatorial control.
12 12 Santa Anna’s army
manages to crush
the rebellion and
restore some order.
Regime does not
collapse, but the
situation comes so
out of hand that the
rebels manage to
hold the president
hostage for several
days.
Archer (2000:
334-335)
x
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Mexico 3 Constitution
of Siete
Leyes/Bases
Orgni-
cas/Centralist
regime of
Santa Anna
22/09/1841 0 06/12/1844 The Bases further strenghtens the
presidency and stricter income
qualifications for voting ensure
that the centralist-conservative
regime still domintate the polit-
ical scene. By 1844, news that
the United States plans to admit
Texas into the union, leads to ef-
forts to raise forces through con-
scription and to levy taxes on a
heavily indepted nation. At this
point Santa Anna lacks sufficient
support to protect his presidency.
In December, General Jos Herrera
leads a coup which ousts Santa
Anna. He is jailed in Jalapa.
0 0 Considered a mili-
tary revolt led by
General Herrera.
Archer (2000:
335); Hamnett
(1999: 147)
Mexico 3 Presidency
of Jos Her-
rera
06/12/1844 0 02/01/1846 Joined by the Mexico City garri-
son under General Gabriel Valen-
cia, Paredes marches into the cap-
ital 2 January. Two days later
a new Council of Representatives
elect him president.
0 0 Considered a mili-
tary revolt led by
generals Mariano
Paredes and Gabriel
Valencia.
Vzquez (2000:
356-359)
Mexico 3 Presidency
of Mariano
Paredes
02/01/1846 0 04/08/1846 On the brink of war, Paredes fail-
ure to defend Mexico against U.S.
hostility together with his monar-
chy project, makes him highly un-
popular. He is left without sup-
porters. Army garrisons rebel in
support of the 1824 constitution
and the return of Santa Anna.
0 0 General Mariano
Salas revolts in
Mexico City with
the support of
Farias.
Vzquez (2000:
360-362); Bazant
(1977: 55-57)
Mexico 3 Interim
Government
under Mar-
iano Salas
and Valentin
Gomez
Farias
04/08/1846 0 22/08/1846 The Constitution of 1824 is re-
stored.
10 10 Considered intended
transformational
process favoured by
federalists in power.
Hamnett (1999:
154); Bazant
(1977: 56-57);
Vzquez (2000:
361)
x
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Mexico 3 Constitution
of 1824/Gov-
ernments of
Santa Anna,
Farias, Salas,
Anaya
22/08/1846 0 15/09/1847 The Mexican War ends in vic-
tory for the United States. On
the evening of 15 September, af-
ter days of heavy battles in and
around Mexico City, their flag
flutters over the national palace,
and Santa Anna resignes the pres-
idency.
6, 7 6 Loss in interstate
war
Vzquez (2000:
362-367); Bazant
(1977: 56-57);
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
350-351)
Mexico 3 United
States
occupation
15/09/1847 0 30/05/1848 On 30 May Mexico and the United
States exchange ratified copies of
the treaty. Presidential elections
favor Jos Herrera, who by the
middle of June re-instates the
government in Mexico City when
U.S. forces leave.
10 10 Both the Mexi-
can and the U.S.
Congress ratify the
treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo ending
the occupation.
Intended transfor-
mational process by
the U.S. occupying
power?
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
351); Vzquez
(2000: 366-369)
Mexico 3 Constitution
of 1824/Gov-
ernments of
Jos Herrera,
Mariano
Arista
30/05/1848 0 20/04/1853 In the aftermath of the Mexican
War, Congress consists of two po-
litical factions, the liberals and
the conservatives. The Liberals
stay in power until 1853. The
years from 1848 until 1853 are
marked by a fragile peacefullness
where the parties’ points of view
are debated in public forum. But
renewed strife is catalyzed by a
military coup led by conservatives
installing Santa Anna back in the
executive.
1, 0 1 Considered a coup
by the conservatives
and their junta sup-
porters inviting back
Santa Anna as pres-
ident.
Bazant (1977:
60)
Mexico 3 Rule of
Antonio
Lopez de
Santa Anna
20/04/1853 0 09/08/1855 The Gadsden purchase, where
Santa Anna sells of the last bit of
land needed to round off the U.S.
territorial acquisition of 1848, is
a step too far for Juan Alvarez
who launches a liberal popular re-
volt endorsed by many segments
of society, including the peasants.
In August Santa Anna tenders his
resignation and goes into exile.
0, 1, 8 8 The revolution of
Ayutla enjoys a
wider base of sup-
port than most
previous antigovern-
ment movements.
Many rebellions take
place around the
conutry. Could be
considered popular
uprising.
Vanderwood
(2010: 371-
373); Meyer and
Sherman 1995:
373-376); Bazant
(1977: 61)
x
x
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Mexico 3 Liberal
interim
governments
of Jun lvarez
and Ignacio
Comonfort
09/08/1855 0 05/02/1857 The new constitution is promul-
gated in February 1857. The con-
stitution provides for the aboli-
tion of clerical and military im-
munities, basic human rights, pro-
tected private property, equality
beofre the law, freedom of speech,
and the preservation of federalist
system with its power in unicam-
eral national legislature.
9 9 Considered substan-
tial political liberal-
ization.
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
379-380); Bazant
(1977: 72-73)
Mexico 3 The Con-
stitution of
1857
05/02/1857 0 15/12/1857 The liberals soon find the imple-
mentation of the constitution go-
ing very slow. In December, the
sitting president Comonfort allies
himself with a conservative gen-
eral, Flix Zuloaga, in a military
coup.
0, 2 2 A self-coup accom-
panied by the mili-
tary.
Vanderwood
(2010)
Mexico 3 Comonfort
presidency
15/12/1857 1 11/01/1858 Within a month Comonfort be-
comes disenchanted with his new
conservative partners. General
Zuloaga decides, with clerical and
military support, to oust Comon-
fort and assume the presidency for
himself. Meanwhile, the liberals
rally under Benito Jurez, Supreme
Court leader and constitutionally
next in line for the presidency.
0 0 A military leader,
Zuloaga seeks to
defend the country
against ”the anar-
chy he sees being
unleashed by liberal-
ism” and overthrows
Comonfort.
Vanderwood
(2010); Meyer
and Sherman
(1995: 381-282)
Mexico 3 Conservative
regime under
Flix Zuloaga
and Miguel
Miramn
11/01/1858 0 01/01/1861 The liberals eventually succeed in
establishing a capital in Veracruz.
For the first two years they are
barely able to hold their guard
against a well-equipped conserva-
tive army. By 1860 the tide turns,
and on New Year’s Day, Jurez and
the liberals enter Mexico City.
5 5 Conservatives loose
in civil war.
Meyer and Sher-
man (1995:
381-384); Van-
derwood (2010)
Mexico 3 Constitution
of 1857/Gov-
ernment of
Benito Jurez
01/01/1861 0 10/07/1863 It takes two efforts before the
French siege Mexico City in June
1863. On May 31, Jurez evacuates
with his army for San Luis Potosi.
7 7 Considered foreign
intervention by
French troops.
Meyer and Sher-
man (1995:
388-391); Van-
derwood (2010);
Hamnett (1999:
167-168)
x
x
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Mexico 3 French
occupation/
Assembly of
Notables/
Regency
of Juan
Almonte,
Jos Mariano
Salas and
Pelagio
Labastida
10/07/1863 0 10/06/1864 The French secure central Mex-
ico. In October a delegation of
Mexican conservatives visits Max-
imilian, Napoleon’s choice for the
throne, and offer him the crown
on behalf of the Assembly. On 10
June Maximilian arrives in Mex-
ico.
10 10 Intended transfor-
mational process by
the sitting regime.
Napoleon III signs
the Convention of
Miramar agreeing
on the relationship
between Napoleon
and Maximilian.
Meyer and Sher-
man (1995:
391-393); Van-
derwood (2010)
Mexico 3 French
occupation/
Rule of
Emperor
Maximilian I
10/06/1864 0 15/07/1867 Several factors, including threats
from the United States who
openly support Jurez, lead to the
withdrawal of French troops in
1866 and 1867. The liberal Juar-
istas under Generals Mariano Es-
cobedo and Porfirio Diaz begin
to put pressure on the Emperor.
Maximilian surrenders after being
surrounded by the liberal army on
15 May.
8 8 Considered a re-
publican uprising
against an unpopu-
lar foreign emperor.
Meyer and Sher-
man (1995:
397-399); Van-
derwood (2010)
Mexico 3 Constitution
of 1857/
Government
of Benito
Jurez/
Government
of Lerdo de
Tejada
15/07/1867 0 21/11/1876 Congress re-elects Jurez for a
fourth term. But the Constitution
is not put aside for other reasons
than this. Diaz does not accept
the decision and revolts, but the
matter is settled when Jurez dies
of illness. It seems that Diaz re-
volts entirely on the principle of
re-election. He accepts the fol-
lowing defeat in the elections after
Jurez death. The winner Lerdo de
Tejada follows the same policies
formulated by Jurez. In March
1876, Diaz launches his Revolu-
tion of Tuxtepec tired of presi-
dents seeking re-election. He cap-
tures Mexico City 21 November
1876.
1 1 Hamnett (1999)
leaves it an open
question whether
the period of the
Restored Repub-
lic (1867-1876) is
marked by a con-
stitutionalism or
personal rule. A
coup d’e´tat, with
soldiers in a number
of states flocking
to Diaz ”effective
suffrage” banner
raises Porfirio Diaz
to the presidency.
Vanderwood
(2010); Meyer
and Sherman
(1995: 409-414);
Hamnett (1999:
180, 196)
x
x
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Mexico 3 Constitution
of 1857/
Governments
of Porfirio
Diaz and
Manuel
Gonzlez
21/11/1876 0 01/12/1884 Gonzlez is elected with a large
majority, maibly due to Diaz’
popularity. Diaz hands over
power peacefully knowing that he
could serve again after the inter-
vening term of Gonzlez. Some ar-
gue that Diaz throws his support
behind Gonzlez beacuse he does
not trust other candidates hand-
ing back power to him if he wins
the 1884 elections (Hamnett 1999:
197). Others reject the portrayal
of Gonzlez as a puppet of Diaz
and argue that Diaz’ dictatorial
aspirations begins with his sec-
ond term. (Meyer and Sherman
1995: 436-437; Coerver 1979). It
seems that Diaz plays the politi-
cal game well, using his four years
out of office to build a new polit-
ical machine to win the upcoming
elections. In September 1884 he
sweeps back to victory.
2, 10 2 Totally contrary
to his principles,
Diaz makes sure
that he is able to
run for president
indefinetely. Diaz
effectively initiates
an autogolpe. He
convinces both
congress and his
personal clients
that sotrng man
rule is necessary for
political stability
and economic devel-
opment. His inner
circle supervise
official newspapers
and marginalizes
opposition. A fur-
ther amendment
to the constitution
removes the spec-
ification for one
reelection making
it possible to run
indefinetely.
Meyer and Sher-
man 1995: 436-
438); Hamnett
(1999: 196-200,
204)
Mexico 3 Regime of
Porfirio Diaz
01/12/1884 0 25/05/1911 Madero’s victory over federal
troops in Ciudad Jurez in April
and the eruption of rebellion
across the country, leads Diaz to
sign a peace treaty and hand over
power to Madero. Diaz signs his
resignations 25 May.
8 8 Considered popular
uprising against
the increasingly
suppressive Diaz
regime.
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
438, 502-505);
Hart (2002:
438-439)
Mexico 3 Interim
Government
of Lon de la
Barra
25/05/1911 0 05/11/1911 Franscisco Madero is opposed
only by minor candidates and
wins the elections. He is installed
5 November.
10 10 Conisdered intended
transformational
process in which an
interim government
hands over power
to an elected one.
Elections are not
based on extensive
suffrage.
Hart (2002:
439); Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
506-509)
x
x
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Mexico 3 Government
of Francisco
Madero
05/11/1911 0 18/02/1913 A military coup begins in Mexico
City in February 1913. General
Manuel Mondragn, supported by
artillery regiments, release rebel
leaders Bernando Reyes and Flix
Diaz from prison and marches on
the National Palace. After ten
days of fighting in Mexico City,
”the Ten Tragic Days”, govern-
ment forces under General Victo-
riano Huerta change sides and ar-
rest Madero and numerous gov-
ernment officers on 18 February.
0 0 Considered a mili-
tary coup after gov-
ernment forces takes
side with the rebels
and order the arrest
of the sitting presi-
dent.
Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
517-521); Hart
(2002: 444-445)
Mexico 3 Government
of Victoriano
Huerta
18/02/1913 0 08/07/1914 While Huerta decides to make a
show of force against the Ameri-
cans in the north, constitutional-
ists and zapatistas fill the military
vacuum in the center. Huerta’s
position becomes unteable. He re-
signs 8 July 1914.
5 5 Considered regime
loss in civil war.
Hart (2002: 449-
451); Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
531-534)
Mexico 3 Interregnum
Mexico 3
08/07/1914 0 01/03/1917 In late 1916 Carranza feels secure
enough to convene a constituent
Congress for the purpose of draw-
ing up a new constitution. In spe-
cial elections in March, Carranza
wins and takes the oath of office 1
May.
5,12 5 Loss in civil war Meyer and
Sherman (1995:
535-539); Hart
(2002: 452-456);
Hamnett (1999:
219-221)
Mexico 3 Govern-
ment of
Venustiano
Carranza
01/03/1917 0 20/05/1920 When Carranza bypasses his for-
mer general Obregn and at-
tempts to impose a pliant suc-
cessor in 1920, Obregn is joined
by Plutarco Calles, Adolfo de la
Huerta and leading Zapatistas in
a march on Mexico City that
drives out Carranza. Carranza is
assassinated 20 May 1920.
1 1 An armed insurrec-
tion led by General
Obregn, Plutarco
Calles and Adolfo
de la Huerta. Not
clear how much pop-
ularity the uprising
enjoys.
Hart (2002:
461-465); Meyer
and Sherman
(1995: 545-550);
Hamnett (1999:
221-223)
Mexico 3 Congres-
sional regime
20/05/1920 0 01/12/1928 President Obregon is assasinated 3 3 President Obregon is
assasinated
x
x
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Mexico 3 PRI Mexico 01/12/1928 0 02/07/2000 On 2 July 2000 the PAN can-
didate Vicente Fox Quesada was
elected president, marking the
end of 71 years of PRI presiden-
tial rule.
9 9 Coded directed lib-
eralization because
of the opening of
the electoral system
through legislation
by the PRI in 1997
Schedler (2000),
Britannica
Mexico 3 Post-single
party Mexico
02/07/2000 0 E Schedler (2000),
Britannica
China 110 Quing
Dynasty pre-
occupation
27/12/1722 0 13/10/1860 In 1858, the Second Opium War
or Arrow War with the French
and the British leads to a tempo-
rary interruption in their dynas-
tic rule. A combined invasion of
British and French forces leads to
an occupation of Beijing in 1860.
7 7 Considered foreign
intervention by
British and French
forces.
Roberts (1996:
214-226); Dillon
(2010: 65-99,
100-104)
China 110 British
and French
occupation
of Beijing
13/10/1860 0 25/10/1860 The Convention of Beijing, un-
der which the Qing court guar-
anteed to respect the provisions
of the treaty is dictated to the
Prince and signed 24 and 25 Octo-
ber by the Prince and Britain and
France.
12 10 The foreign powers
get what they came
for. The signing
of the Convention
of Beijing concludes
the conflict. It is
a humiliating defeat
to the Qing court.
The court is restored
to the capital.
Dillon (2010:
102-104); Britan-
nica
China 110 Qing Dy-
nasty/
Reign of the
Xianfeng
Emperor
25/10/1860 0 11/11/1861 Xianfeng is succeeded by Tongzhi
whos is only five years old. The
Qing court appoints eight regents
to rule during his minority. His
mother Cixi and Ci’an, the wife of
Xianfeng dissaproves of the choice
of regents, despose them in a
palace coup and take power, rul-
ing jointly as regents with Prince
Gong. Most of the regents are be-
headed.
1 1 Considered a palace
coup.
Dillon (2010:
104-106); Britan-
nica
x
x
ix
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China 110 Qing Dy-
nasty/
Regency of
Cixi, Ci’an
and Prince
Gong/
Tongzhi
Regency
11/11/1861 0 25/02/1875 When Tongzhi dies the two em-
presses og on to act as regents.
Their choice of Zaitian as suc-
cessor should according to the
laws of dynastic succesion have
been ineligible. However Empress
Cixi is influental enough to pre-
vail and Zaitian is crowned as
the Guangxu Emperor 25 Febru-
ary 1875.
2, 10 2 Could be considered
a self-coup, but
there is not much
information on the
transition of power
from Tongzhi to
Guangxu.
Dillon (2010:
105); Britannica
China 110 Qing Dy-
nasty/Regency
of Empress
Cixi/Reign
of the
Emperor
Guangxu
25/02/1875 0 21/09/1898 Fearing that China is on the brink
of partition because of increas-
ing foreign pressure, with powers
carving out spheres of influence
on Chinese territory, and the in-
evitable defeat in war with Japan,
The Emperor Guangxu initiates
a number of radical reforms as a
solution to the worsening condi-
tions of his dynasty. The refom-
rms include a total restructuring
of government and the creation
of a cabinet, a national assembly
and a constitution. This leads the
conservatives in the court to rally
around the Empress Cixi. On 21
September 1898 the Emperor is
detained and Cixi immediately re-
stores herself as de facto ruler.
1 1 Cixi resumes the re-
gency, after having
nominally retired in
1889. She is brought
back in power in a
coup orchestrated by
the Qing court’s old
order.
Dillon (2010:
115-117); Britan-
nica
x
x
x
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China 110 Qing Dy-
nasty/
de-facto rule
of Empress
Cixi
21/09/1898 0 14/08/1900 In reaction to what they see as
a menace of Western influence
in China, militia units known as
the boxers, move away from its
anti-Qing traditions and trans-
fer their allegiance to the court
in a struggle against foreigners.
Large numbers of people convert
to the Boxer cause. Initially,
the court attempts at a neutral
stance, but soon finds itself sup-
porting the rebellion. Cixi de-
cided to take part in the hostil-
ities by ordering troops to join
the uprising. Foreign legations in
Beijing are under siege for eight
weeks. Foreign powers gather a
20 000 strong force that captures
Beijing 14 August 1900. Russia
uses the Boxer rebellion as pretext
to invade Manchuria.
6 6 Defeat in interstate
war
Dillon (2010:
121-130); Britan-
nica
China 110 Eight Nation
Alliance
occupation
14/08/1900 0 07/09/1901 It takes a year to get a treaty
ready to be signed. The one-sided
content of the Boxer Protocol is
a humiliation for the Qing court
inflicting severe punishments on
Chinese officials. Cixi agrees to
the terms after being assured of
her continued reign. The for-
eign governments agree to with-
draw their troops apart from lega-
tion guards.
10 10 Considered an
intended transfor-
mational process
dictated by the
foreign powers.
The United States,
part of the eight
nation alliance,
prevents a partition
of China in the
protocol insisting
on the preservation
of China’s territo-
rial integrity. The
foreign powers are
given the rights to
occupy 12 towns
along the coast to
give them access to
the sea.
Dillon (2010:
126-131); Britan-
nica
x
x
x
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China 110 Qing Dy-
nasty/
de-facto rule
of Empress
Cixi
07/09/1901 0 01/01/1912 On 14 November 1908 Emperor
Guangxu suddenly dies at the age
of 37. The Empress dies the day
after. The Emperor is succeeded
by Puyi (the Xuantong Emperor),
the son of Prince Chun. Chun
is nominal but ineffectual regent
during the reign of the infant Em-
peror. Court policy remains in
the hands of court officials who
continue to attempt to modernize
government until the Revolution
of 1911. The Xinhai revolution
overthrows the Qing Dynasty.
8 8 Initially sparked by
an army mutiny in
Wuhan urged on
by revolutionaries
and the province
secession from the
Empire triggers a
chain reaction in
which province after
province declares
their independence
from the Qing court.
Dillon (2010:
135-139, 143,
145-146); Britan-
nica
China 110 Provisional
presidency of
Sun Yat-sen
01/01/1912 0 10/03/1912 Meanwhile, Yuan Shikai, who at
the time is prime minister at the
court, and his troops demands the
abdication of the emperor. On
12 February the Emperor abdi-
cates. The day after Yuan Shikai
declares his support for the Re-
public. The samy day Sun Yat-
sen expresses his willingness to
step down as president in favor
of Shikai. Shikai is formally in-
ducted into office 10 March.
10,8,1 10 Transformational
process by sitting
regime
Dillon (2010:
145-147); Britan-
nica
x
x
x
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China 110 Provisional
Constitu-
tion of the
Republic
of China/
Provisional
Presidency
of Yuan
Shikai
10/03/1912 0 15/12/1913 Song Jiaoren, leader of the Guo-
mindang, at the moment the
largest political coalition in the
new Parliament works to bring
Guomindang to power through
constitutional mechanisms estab-
lished under the provisional con-
stitution. After winning elec-
tions, Jiaoren works for the cab-
inet to be brought under control
of the majority party. Jiaoren
is shortly in early 1913 found
dead at the Shanghai railway sta-
tion. In June Yuan Shikai dis-
misses provincial governors who
had supported Guomindang in the
elections. A deposed governor de-
clares war on Yuan. The revolt
is supressed and Yuan orders that
all representatives of Guomindang
in the provincial assemblies be
dismissed. On 15 December the
National Assembly is replaced by
a Political Conference completely
under his control.
2 2 Considered a self-
coup by the sitting
leader Yuan Shikai.
Dillon (2010:
146-152); Britan-
nica
China 110 Authoritar-
ian Regime
of Yuan
Shikai
15/12/1913 0 06/06/1916 Having initially gained popular-
ity for defending China’s interests
against Japan’s ultimatum that
China should concede key areas of
economic policy and government
to Japan under the Twenty-One
Demands, he becomes highly un-
popular with his attempt to re-
store monarchy. After some of the
southwestern provinces declare in-
dependence from China 21 May
1916, he decides to abandon his
plans of restoration of a monar-
chy hoping that this could avert
civil war. The revolt spreads with
military leaders declaring their
provinces independent. Yuan
Shikai dies on 6 June 1916.
4 4 Several military re-
volts end in decla-
rations of indepen-
dence in province
after province, but
this does not topple
the regime in Bei-
jing, even if they
loose large pieces of
territory. Regime
change in the capital
comes as the result
of the death of Yuan.
Dillon (2010:
152-159); Britan-
nica
x
x
x
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China 110 Beyiang
military rule
under Li
Yuanhong
06/06/1916 0 14/06/1917 Duan wants to side with the U.S.
and enter war, but Li refuses,
dismisses Duan and calls General
Zhang Xun, a Qing-loyalist and
Yuan Shikai supporter, to medi-
ate. Zhang demands that Li dis-
solves the Parliament. Right af-
ter, Zhang enters Beijing with his
army and sets about to restore the
Dynasty.
0 0 Military coup of the
Capital to restore
dynastic rule.
Dillon 2010: 160-
162); Britannica
China 110 Zhang Xun’s
coup d’e´tat/
Manchu
Restoration
14/06/1917 0 14/07/1917 Duan captures Beijing 14 July.
Duan resumes his role as prime
minister, with Feng Gochang as
acting president. Feng brings his
own army division.
0 0 Counter coup by
Duan’s army to re-
store the Republic.
Dillon (2010:
160-161) Britan-
nica
China 110 Beyiang
Military
rule under
Duan’s
Anhui Clique
14/07/1917 0 06/07/1920 On 4 May 1919 a mass demon-
stration breaks out in which stu-
dents in Beijing protest against
the terms of the Paris Peace Con-
ference, initiating the May Fourth
Movement. Violence breaks out
in Beijing. The overseas Guomin-
dang endorses the movement. The
government soon complies and re-
fuses to sign the treaty. But the
Anhui clique’s power is deteriorat-
ing, and the Feng’s faction, the
Zhili Clique takes advantage of
the situation. War breaks out in
Beijing between the two military
factions of Beyiang in July 1920,
ending Anhui domination in gov-
ernment.
8,5 5 civil war Dillon (2010:
160-162, 175-
178); Britannica
China 110 Interreg-
num China
1/ Era of
Warlords-
post-
July1920
06/07/1920 0 10/10/1928 The National Revolutionary Army
captures Beijing on 6 June 1928.
On October 10 a National Govern-
ment of the Republic of China is
established, the first to be able to
do so with justification since the
death of Yuan Shikai. The Guo-
mindang government in power is
accepted by most of the south and
most of the north.
5 5 Loss in civil war Dillon (2010:
158-159, 209-
212); Britannica
x
x
x
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China 110 Nationalist
government
in Nanjing
10/10/1928 0 13/12/1937 Throughout the next decade, the
Nationalists struggle with frag-
mentation and the growing CCP
in the west. When the Sino-
Japanese war begins, the nation-
alists and CCP decide agree to
form a united front against Japan.
On Dec 13, japanese froces cap-
ture the capital Nanjing.
6 6 Loss in inter-state
war with Japan
Dillon (2010:
158-159, 209-
212), Britannica,
Brecher and
Wilkenfeld
(1997:157)
China 110 Japanese
occupation
of Nanjing/
interregnum/
rivalling
between
Chinese and
Japanese
control
13/12/1937 0 15/08/1945 The Pacific War ended on Aug 15
1945 with formal Japanese surren-
der submitted on September 2.
6 6 Loss in inter-state
war
Britannica,
Brecher and
Wilkenfeld
(1997:157),
Heazle and
Knight (2007:94)
China 110 Interreg-
num/ NRA-
PLA civil
war
15/08/1945 01/10/1949 After over three years of war be-
tween Nationalist and Commu-
nist forces, PLA finally controlled
most of the mainland and Chair-
man Mao proclaimed the estab-
lishment of the People’s Republic
of China
5,8 5 Civil war loss for
PLA’s enemies and a
popularly based rev-
olution (Britannica).
Civil war deemed
most decisive factor.
Britannica,
Heazle and
Knight (2007:94),
Gao (2009: 363)
China 110 People’s
Republic of
China
01/10/1949 E Britannica, Gao
(2009: 363)
x
x
x
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D A note on the coding of interregnum
HRD includes a dichotomous variable to capture interregnum periods (v3interreg), as listed
in Appendix A. In HRD, interregnum is not coded as a way of “filling in” for complicated
gradual changes (in contrast to the widely used Polity2 measure from Marshall, Gurr and
Jaggers, 2013), such as the case of early-1920s Italy discussed in the paper. Rather an
interregnum period is coded for situations where no governing elite or body is in place to
effectively control/determines policies in major parts of the Polity.
One example is the three month-period that followed in Wallachia (now Romania) in 1848
after a group of revolutionaries forced the sitting Prince Bibescu to support the revolutionary
program and name a provisional government. Two days later, the Prince abdicated because
of increasing threats, and the Russian consul, responsible for the then-operating Russian
Protectorate of Wallachia, left Bucharest. During the following three months, no attempt at
consolidating rule was successful (Oetea, 1970; Treptow, 1996). The interregnum period of
Wallachia ended when the Ottoman Porte invaded on September 25th 1848.
Another example is the two year-civil war that ravaged Egypt between 1803 and 1805.
After Ottoman occupation in March 1803, Albanian forces under Tahir Pasha assumed
government in May. When Pasha was assassinated in June that year, however, the area
spiraled into civil war. When power was eventually consolidated, the subsequent regime of
Mohammed Ali lasted for a total of 61 years.
Our coders were instructed to be conservative with applying the interregnum coding.
One key note in this regard is that the common denominator for most interregnum periods
is civil war. However, we also note that there are numerous instances of civil war where the
country is still assigned a regime (i.e., scored as 0 on the interregnum dummy), for example
territorial civil wars located in particular regions in the periphery but where a government
still clearly controls power for most of the territory.
xxxvi
E Common types of events that are candidates for
regime change
Table A-4 gives an overview of the kinds of events that trigger regime change codings in
HRD. For each type of event, we also give a very short description of how we delineate
the threshold for whether or not a regime breakdown is coded. First and foremost, the
latter thresholds describe when events are deemed to introduce a substantial change to the
formal or informal rules that determine how leaders are selected and maintained (and, as
such, clarifies the operational boundaries of our definition of regime change). Because of
the empirical complexity of the different cases, and our aim to be flexible when coding each
individual case, this list is far from exhaustive.1 However, the list displays the most common
rules-of-thumb applied consistently in the coding.
1If a case does not fit our scheme, we allow it to be coded as “other” rather than shoehorning it into our
pre-defined categorization.
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Regime change event Description
Head executive term extensions Extension of presidential term limits is coded as regime change in HRD when
this represents a clear move towards consolidating power by the sitting regime.
Abolition of presidential term limits is always coded as regime change, if
the sitting regime is not already a full-fledged and legislatively consolidated
autocracy. They are coded with end type 2 - self-coup.
Other autocratic legislation Legislative action such as changes to the constitution that do not concern the
durability of the head executive office can also be coded regime change. This
happens in instances where, e.g., severe restrictions are laid on the opposi-
tion, or one-party domination of the legislative branch is formalized. These
instances are coded end type 2 - self-coup.
Suffrage extensions Suffrage extensions are coded as regime change when they concern large shares
of the population and if, and only if, the extension occurs in regimes where
the formal rules correspond with the informal rules. These are coded end
type 9 - guided liberalization.
Other democratizing legislation Regime change is coded for instances such as formalization of democratic
rights or promulgation of democratic institutions when these mark substantial
departures from less democratic forms of government. They are coded if, and
only if, they result in regimes where the formal rules correspond with the
informal rules. These are coded end type 9 - guided liberalization.
Independence When polities that have had limited autonomy transfer into independence,
this is coded as regime change when the previous non-independent entity still
enjoyed a good deal of autonomy and their polities worked differently than
its sovereign entity. 2 If the transition is made by creating a democratic
constitution that is subsequently adhered to de facto, this is coded end type
9 - guided liberalization. If it does not have democratic qualities it is coded
end type 10 - directed transition.
Restructuring legislative action Legislative action by the sitting regime that is not related to outright de-
mocratization or autocratization is coded regime change when they alter the
core make-up of the regime such as transitioning from a parliamentary to a
presidential system, or transitioning out of transitional regimes into regimes
that are no more or less democratic than the previous, e.g. after coups or
civil wars. These are coded end type 10 - directed transition.
Relatively free and fair elections Free and fair elections are coded as regime change when held in regimes where
this is not the norm, and where the results of the elections are adhered to.
These are coded end type 9 - guided liberalization when the elections are part
of a greater development by the state to liberalize. When they are not, they
are coded end type 11 - liberalization without guidance of sitting regime.
Fraudulent elections Elections in which substantial reports of vote fraud are given, are coded as
regime change when they appear in regimes which have otherwise held elec-
tions that are free and fair. Reports of vote buying do not suffice, there must
also be deliberate obstructions of the right to a free vote or apparent tamper-
ing with election results. These instances are coded end type 2 - self-coup.
Wars Inter- and intra-state wars are recorded as regime change when they efficiently
either expel the sitting government or almost totally obstructs its ability to
exert power. We code by emphasizing capitol rule - even when substantial
areas of the country is beyond governmental control, the sitting regime con-
tinues as long as it has control over the capitol. These have their own end
type 5 - civil war and 6 - inter-state war.
Effective coups Describe different kinds of coups and coup settings?
Table A-4: Table of regime changing events (non-exhaustive)
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F Formal and informal rule changes and regime change
In the paper, we discussed at length how we consider the relevance of formal and infor-
mal rules for selecting and maintaining leaders when defining regimes, and how substantial
changes to both formal and informal rules – in different circumstances – may trigger regime
change. For instance, a constitutional democratic regime may end through changes in its
formal rules (through substantial liberalization, e.g. introduction of universal suffrage, or
through non-liberalizing legislative action, e.g. changing from parliamentarism to strong
versions of presidentialism), or through changes to its informal rules (e.g., substantial ma-
nipulations of elections that allow incumbents to retain office). In the paper, we also discuss
some key issues pertaining to when formal rules are used for identifying the regime (when
formal and informal rules correspond, broadly speaking) as well as how we may consider the
identity of the actors supporting the regime as operational heuristics in cases where infor-
mal rules define the regime. In this section, we present some considerations and important
rules-of-thumb that complement this discussion.
The thresholds applied for considering changes in formal or informal rules to be un-
derstood as substantial (in widely varying real-world scenarios) must, in an application
concerned with de facto rather than de jure changes, inevitably be related to subjective
judgements. Very reasonable arguments can certainly be made to move the threshold both
in a more restrictive and in a more lenient direction, for different types of scenarios. (As
mentioned, our thresholds for coding regime changes are typically lower than those applied
in the most comparable extant dataset, Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014).) However, we
have applied thresholds that we, after much thinking and some revisions after trial coding
of particular cases, find to be the most sensible. Discussions of the sensibility of the par-
ticular locations of thresholds aside, one clear advantage with our approach is the emphasis
we have placed on internal consistency in the coding, aiming to employ similar thresholds
for similar types of scenarios across countries and time, better enabling cross-country and
inter-temporal comparisons.
Table A-6 clarifies the instances in which formal and informal rules are used as founda-
tions for regime coding, listed for each category of the regime end type variable. For each
of these categories, we present typical examples of situations that would be considered a
substantial change in formal or informal rules, leading to the coding of regime breakdown.
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End type Informal rules emphasized Formal rules emphasized
Military coups Military coups are always expressions
of altered informal rules for selecting
leaders
None
Coups Very often expressions of altered infor-
mal rules for selecting leaders
Can in rare instances focus on formal
rules as in electoral coups
Self-coups Self-coups are, by definition, actions
driven by any given regime’s incum-
bent to consolidate power. This can
be achieved through changes to infor-
mal rules, e.g. through expulsion of
coalition partners or removal of credi-
ble opposition.
Can also be achieved by changing for-
mal rules, e.g. through constitutional
changes that diminish the role of the
legislature or removal of restrictions on
presidential term-limits.
Assassination Always expressions of informal rules
changing as the leader must be domi-
nant for the regime to change as a con-
sequence of assassination
None
Natural death Always expressions of informal rules
changing as the leader must be domi-
nant for the regime to change as a con-
sequence of natural death. Deaths of
monarchs in formal hereditary monar-
chies will not constitute regime change
(Example: Death of Franco)
None
Civil war Most often informal through change of
leadership (If formal rules in play in
combination, these will be related to
subsequent developments and not to
take-over of power)
In rare instances formal rules are em-
phasized when peace settlements or
similar agreements are made
Inter-state war Most often informal through change of
leadership (If formal rules in play in
combination, these will be related to
subsequent developments and not to
take-over of power)
In rare instances formal rules are em-
phasized when peace settlements or
similar agreements are made
Foreign intervention In some cases concerned with informal
rules because of leadership changes
Can also be focused on formal rules i.e.
through territorial concessions or the
like
Popular uprising Informal rules emphasized when the
consequence of the uprising is leader-
ship removal or step-down
Formal rules emphasized when the
popular pressure has forced legislative
action
Directed democratization Concerned with informal rules if free
and fair elections are held that conjoin
the formal and informal rules
Concerned with formal rules when
democratic institutions, a constitution
or other legislative action is made
Directed transition Concerned with informal rules only to
delineate the extent to which these cor-
respond with formal rules
Most often concerned with formal rules
through incumbent regime legislative
action
Non-directed democratization By definition concerned with informal
rules as the formal rules of the sitting
regime cannot be changed without di-
rection.
None
Table A-6: Table of formal/informal rules
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G Clarifying and illustrating distinctions between di-
rected transitions and self-coups
As we show in the paper, a substantial number of the regime breakdowns coded in HRD are
so-called “directed transitions”. In the 14-category scheme for v3regendtype, we distinguish
between guided transitions that are accompanied by political liberalization, on the one hand,
and all other types of guided transitions. This distinction reflects the importance of elite-
led processes of political liberalization historically, but also as a point of focus of theoretical
models of regime change (see, e.g., O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986; Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006). We provide the entire 14-category scheme for v3regendtype in Appendix A,
but for the purpose of clarifying and distinguishing between these particular types of regime
changes, here is the category wording for the two directed transition categories.
 Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by
sitting regime leaders
 Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under
the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization)
Examples of guided liberalization processes include the type of processes observed, e.g., in
Spain after the death of Franco, where democratic institutions were introduced (in a gradual
manner) by extant regime elites, but also a number of substantial franchise extensions (often
in 19th century polities) are coded as guided liberalization processes. One example is the
introduction of the Reform Act in 1832 (March 15) in the United Kingdom, which marks
the breakdown of what we have called the Post-Act of Settlement regime extending back to
1701.
Regarding the other directed regime transitions, these include different cases of inten-
tionally guided regime changes pursued by the incumbent regime – excluding those that are
related to liberalization processes. One typical case of such a directed transition is illus-
trated by the transformational process instigated by Charles de Gaulle in France after the
Algiers crisis of 1958. Dated to January 8, 1959, when the new constitution came into force,
the change led to the end of the parliamentary Fourth Republic, and the beginning of the
current semi-presidential Fifth Republic. Other examples of directed transitions include the
1922 Latvian transition into a unicameral parliamentary republic under President Ulmanis,
the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the transition into the Pakistani Islamic
Republic in 1956, as well as most transitions into partial and/or complete independence for
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former colonies in Africa, Asia and Latin-America. (Exceptions are transitions where sub-
stantial uprisings, coups or civil war-like circumstances prompted the end of colonization.)
In addition to the two categories discussed above, v3regendtype includes a separate cat-
egory for self-coups. In brief, a self-coup (or autogolpe) is a regime transformation involving
the incumbent leader, resulting in a substantial consolidation of power in the hands of this
leader. In other words, this regime transformation requires the intentional actions and co-
operation of at least one key actor of the old regime, namely the chief executive (although
other key regime actors are often also involved). The crucial defining feature of this category,
however, and which sets it apart from the two guided transformation categories above, is
that it represents a substantial concentration of power in the hands of the leader, after the
change of the formal or informal rules for leader selection and maintenance has taken place.
Since measuring power, and registering increased concentration of power, is inherently dif-
ficult, this means that this category is sometimes hard to differentiate from “other directed
regime transitions”.Let us therefore further elaborate on and illustrate this issue:
Typical examples of self-coups occur with the passing of legislation that clearly tilts the
balance of power towards the executive (typically president) and away from the legislative
body. In some cases, such as the 1992 Fujimori self-coup in Peru, an event occurs that
immediately restricts the choices available to the legislature or opposition in such a way that
coding v3regendtype as self-coup stands out as a clear decision. Fujimori was assisted by
the military in dissolving Congress, before having a new legislature elected and subsequently
a new constitution promulgated (Levitsky, 1999). In other cases, such as the transition to
Fascist rule in Italy, as discussed in the paper, coding v3regendtype as a guided transformation
or self-coup is more readily debatable. The discussed Acerbo Law was, indeed, passed in the
Senate, which based on a de jure approach to coding regime breakdown might indicate that
the accompanying regime change did not entail a self-coup. Yet, when taking into account
the strong-man tools used by the Fascist groupings, the inherent block on any opposition
influence on policy that the Acerbo Law imposed, and the ultimate concentration of power
in the hands of Mussolini, v3regendtype is coded as a self-coup.
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H Polity changes and regime changes
The country-units, or more precisely polity-units – note that several colonies and other non-
independent entities are also treated as separate units – used for the HRD coding, are the
careful definitions laid out in V-Dem’s country-unit document (v.8; Coppedge et al. 2018).
We will not go into the details on how V-Dem delineates polities and determines their time
series here, but instead refer interested readers to the noted document for the general rules
for defining polities as well as details on exactly which areas are counted, in any given time
period, for each polity. To exemplify the latter, we provide an excerpt for a definition of one
country (Romania) from the V-Dem country units document (Coppedge et al. 2018, 27):
Romania (190)
 Coded: 1789-
 History: Principality of Wallachia under Ottoman suzerainty (1789-1861); Austrian
occupation (1789-1791); Russian Occupation (1807-1812); direct Ottoman rule (1821-
1822); Russian occupation (1828-1834); incorporates Ottoman rayas north of the Danube
(1829); Russian protectorate (1834-1854); Russian occupation (1853-1854); Austrian
occupation (1854-1856); personal union with Moldavia (1859-1862); United Roma-
nian Principalities (1862-1866); Romania (1866-1881); cedes three districts in southern
Bessarabia to Russia and incorporates northern Dobruja (1878); Kingdom of Roma-
nia (1881-1947); annexes southern Dobruja (1913); occupied by Central Powers (1916);
Dobruja annexed by Bulgaria (1918); Bessarabia incorporated into Romania (1918); in-
corporates Dobruja, Bukovina and Transylvania (1919); Soviet occupation (1944-1947);
Peoples Republic of Romania (1947-1965); Socialist Republic of Romania (1965-1989);
Romania (1989- ).
 Note: Please only code Wallachia between 1789 and 1862. Between 1900 and 1918
includes only pre-World War I territory. Includes Southern Dobruja 1913-1940, Bas-
sarabia 1918-1940 and 1941-1944. Does not include Northern Transylvania 1940-1947.
Does not include territories to the East annexed during World War II.
This categorization of polities also defines the time series for which an entity is coded for
all relevant V-Dem variables, including the HRD variables. This brings up the question of
how to code regime changes – following our definition laid out in the paper, pertaining to
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substantial changes in formal or informal rules on the selection and maintenance of political
leaders – in cases where polities merge, are born, disappear, or reappear. We discuss the
rules and coding practices of some prominent such cases below, and illustrate them with
specific examples.
H.1 When federations/unions form and dissolve
In cases where two or more polities merge to form a single polity or when an existing polity
dissolves, regime changes are coded in many, but not all, instances. In cases where mergers of
separate polities into single countries, unions or federations occur – that is, when none of the
merging or acquired polities become colonies or receive similar subordinate status – regime
changes are always recorded for all polities involved, typically preceded by a regime end
that is coded as a “directed transition”. Instances of such processes include the formation
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922, the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes (later named the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) in 1918, and the formation
of the Ethiopian - Eritrean Federation under Haile Selassie in 1952. These three instances
were all results of directed transitions, even though the cooperation between the parties was
substantially influenced by the uneven power balance in all three cases.
We may draw on the same polities for illustrating the coding pertaining to when countries
dissolve. The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 was a seminal event, with global ripple
effects. For many of the 15 now Post-Soviet states, the dissolution led to considerable
societal and political upheaval. These instances are recorded as regime change for all polities
involved, and the regime end type in most of these cases is coded as liberalization without
direction from sitting regime leaders. In contrast, for the dissolution of the Ethiopian-
Eritrean Federation in 1991-1993, only Eritrea, which de facto became a separate state in
1991, has this event recorded as regime change. Eritrea’s de facto independence, on May
24, came after the advances of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF/EPLF). This
date of de facto independence is also registered as the date of regime change for Eritrea.
But, May 1991 is a crucial month for Ethiopia as well. In fact, Ethiopia registers a regime
change when Mengistu, the regime’s strong-man leader since 1974, was forced from power by
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front(EPRDF). This happened on May
28th, which is the recorded date of regime change. These two situations are, of course,
inherently interlinked – the fall of Mengistu’s regime, and the demise of centralized power of
the incumbent regime, was linked to the successes of both the TPLF/EPLF as the EPRDF.
Yet, the processes are treated as distinct in our regime coding, with different degrees of
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relevance to each of the two polities, and they are thus not coded as the same regime-change
event.3
While Ethiopia/Eritrea is a rather special case of a dissolving, contiguous polity in the
dataset, a similar logic as that laid out above is applied for the coding of nearly all de-
colonizing transitions. When a colony breaks away from its former colonizer, this is coded
as a regime change in the colony but does typically not constitute a regime change event in
the colonizer polity. This is because the de facto rules for selecting and maintaining leaders
typically do not experience substantial changes in the colonizer. We turn now to a different
issue of regime coding in colonies.
H.2 The relevance of colonizer polity regime changes on the col-
onized polity
When colonies become independent, or achieve limited, but still meaningful autonomy in
some way, regime change is, as noted, only coded for the colony. Similarly, regime change
is only recorded in the colonized polity when transitions take effect for the local rule of
the colony. In other words, regime changes in colonizer countries are only coded as regime
changes in the colonized polity if the former clearly lead to de facto changes in the rules of
relevance in the colony. This distinction is observed for most French colonies in the 20th
century, when Vichy French administrations take over during WWII. For the colonies, the
dates do, however, consistently follow the specific developments in the individual countries
rather than internal French developments. The French Third Republic ends with the German
invasion on July 10th, 1940. In most of French West Africa, the Vichy French government is
instated on the same day, but in French Indochina, the change only happens two months later
on September 22nd, after Japan interferes. In extension, when the transition from the Fourth
to the Fifth Republic took effect in France, this event did not – in itself – imply transitions in
the French Colonies. However, most French colonies transitioned into first partial, then full,
independence, over the same period. While these regime changes occurring in both France
and its colonies can very well be understood as causally interlinked, the transitions in each
colony are treated and coded separately.
3Note that Eritrea is coded as a separate polity in V-Dem from 1900, covering, for example, the colonial
era, the federation period and the period after 1962 when it is a constituent part of Ethiopia.
xlv
I Temporal heterogeneity: Coups and uprisings
In the paper we estimated a Bayesian Change Point model on the average frequency of
all regime breakdowns over time, responding to the question of whether there are likely
“structural breaks” in the yearly stability of regimes across modern history. This exercise
identified four plausible such change points, namely in 1798 (starting off the first high-
frequency period, or wave, of breakdowns), 1881 (starting the first low-frequency, or crest,
period), 1913 (starting second wave), and 1995 (starting second crest).
Yet, as our discussion and interpretation of descriptive statistics in the paper made
abundantly clear, different modes of breakdowns have followed their own (non-linear) trends
across this long time interval. For example, over the last couple of decades, we have seen
a decreasing number of regime breakdowns due to coups (especially when compared to the
1960s and 70s), whereas regime breakdowns due to popular uprisings have been on the
increase, at least since the late-1990s.
This notion of such different trends, reflecting that different eras may harbor structural
conditions that conduce some types of regime changes but are less conducive to others,
is further corroborated when we employ the same Change Point set-up to regime changes
stemming (only) from particular modes of breakdown. For instance, we do not obtain similar
– or even close to similar – timing of the estimated change points, when we analyze coups
(by the military and by other actors, combined) and popular uprisings separately.
The results for coups are presented in Figures A-2 and A-3. Without describing or
interpreting these results in too much detail, we simply note that for coups, the change
point model detects two change points, namely right after 1960 and right after 1980. These
years mark the start and end points of a clear uptick in the frequency of coup-induced
transitions globally. As noted in the paper, the 1960s and 70s experienced a large number
of coups, globally, and particularly in recently de-colonized states in Sub-Saharan Africa.
(We here remind that these polities are typically coded back to 1900, or even further back,
as colonies for HRD, and are thus also included in the sample prior to 1960). As we also
discuss in the paper, recent work on coups, drawing on post-1960 data, have highlighted the
declining trend for coups over the last few decades. What is less appreciated, however, is
that the post-1960s period also marked a clear break with previous decades when it comes
to coup frequency.
Interestingly, when we run our baseline model employed in the paper on coup-breakdowns
for the split samples demarcated by the change point (see Table A-7), an intermediate level of
democracy is clearly related to higher coup frequency for all time periods. For the economic
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determinants, however, there are stronger indications of temporal heterogeneity. Notably,
neither income level nor short-term growth were related to coups during the long 1789–
1962 period. In contrast, we find that poorer countries were systematically more likely to
experience coup breakdowns during the “coup wave” from 1962–1981, whereas during the
low-frequency period after 1981 experiencing low short-term growth is clearly associated with
increased risk of coup breakdown. These differences should direct our attention to structural
factors and omitted variables that trend over time but are not included in the baseline model.
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Figure A-2: Change points for coups, 1789-2014
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Figure A-3: Posterior probabilities of change points for coups, 1789-2014
changepoints.pdf
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Table A-7: Logit models on the risk of regime breakdowns due to coups across different
periods, as defined by coup-specific change points
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4)
Period: 1789-2014 1789-1962 1962-1981 1981-2014
Democracy 7.308*** 5.610* 8.566** 12.337**
(5.00) (2.56) (3.18) (3.13)
Democracy2 -10.566*** -10.550** -11.201** -14.629**
(-5.36) (-2.76) (-3.06) (-3.16)
L(GDP p.c.) -0.212 -0.021 -0.420* -0.390
(-1.49) (-0.11) (-2.02) (-1.13)
L(Population) 0.003 0.025 0.181* -0.148
(0.05) (0.34) (2.03) (-0.96)
GDP p.c. growth -0.009** -0.011 -0.005 -0.030**
(-2.82) (-1.25) (-1.17) (-3.20)
Region-FE X X X X
Year-FE X X X X
Duration terms X X X X
N 12404 5946 2472 2743
AIC 2750.379 1495.031 718.097 475.715
ll -1224.189 -643.515 -325.048 -201.858
l
The change point model produces quite different results when we zoom in on regime
breakdowns due to popular uprisings. While such breakdowns, overall, are less frequent
than coup breakdowns, they have experienced some dramatic historical spikes over very
limited time intervals, one such spike coming around 1848/9 and another during and right
after WWI (see Figure A-4). Right around these spikes, the change point model is unable
to yield strong predictions (as captured by the posterior probability densities) about which
“state of the world” obtains, when it comes to the risk uprising-induced regime death (see
Figure A-5). The model does, however, clearly predict that the pre-1848 state was differently
from the state in, say, 1855, and likewise when comparing the years prior to WWI with, say,
1925.
Interestingly, the baseline model run on split samples, reported in Table A-8, provides
suggestive evidence that the determinants of popular uprisings may have differed across the
different “states” of modern history. Income level is significantly associated with breakdowns
due to popular uprisings in the period spanning the two French revolutions of 1789 and 1848,
but also during time period from 1917–2014. Note, however, that a higher level of income
is positively associated with the outcome in the first period and negatively associated in
the last period. Hence, while richer countries were more likely to experience regime deaths
due to popular uprisings in the early part of modern history, poor countries are more likely
to experience such regime breakdowns after WWI. In this latter period, low short-term
economic growth is also associated with regime death due to uprisings, in contrast with the
insignificant relationships observed in prior periods.
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Figure A-4: Change points for uprisings, 1789-2014
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Figure A-5: Posterior probabilities of change points for uprisings, 1789-2014
changepoints.pdf
Posterior probability of different states ( uprisings )
Time
Pr
(S
t=
 
k 
|Y t
)
1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0 llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
liii
Table A-8: Logit models on the risk of regime breakdown due to popular uprisings across
different time periods, as defined by uprising-specific change points
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4)
Period: 1789-2014 1789-1848 1848-1917 1917-2014
Democracy 7.308*** 26.901* 6.376 10.118***
(5.00) (2.57) (1.23) (5.49)
Democracy2 -10.566*** -68.443** -20.742 -13.480***
(-5.36) (-2.72) (-1.55) (-5.65)
L(GDP p.c.) -0.212 0.737* -0.436 -0.404*
(-1.49) (2.16) (-1.79) (-2.41)
L(Population) 0.003 0.174 -0.162 0.051
(0.05) (1.00) (-1.05) (0.73)
GDP p.c. growth -0.009** 0.034 0.013 -0.008*
(-2.82) (0.30) (0.14) (-2.30)
Region-FE X X X X
Year-FE X X X X
Duration terms X X X X
N 12404 586 1787 9580
AIC 2750.379 271.299 550.556 1916.650
LL -1224.189 -101.649 -222.278 -862.325
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